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Your Digital Footprint Left Behind at Death: An
Illustration of Technology Leaving the Law Behind
Sandi S. Varnado∗
INTRODUCTION
“Death in the digital age is a lot more complicated than it used to
be.”1 Americans spend a substantial portion of their waking hours on
some sort of electronic device, with a large amount of that time spent
online.2 Recent studies reveal that an estimated 85% of American
adults use the Internet3 and spend an average of 23 hours a week (or
14% of the time available in a week) online.4 The figures are even
higher for young American adults. Ninety-eight percent of 18 to 29
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1. Patrick Marshall, Digital Estate Planning Often Forgotten, SEATTLE TIMES
(Jan. 7, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/20171
71847_pfdigitalestates08.html [http://perma.cc/T8GQ-U5PH] (archived Mar. 4,
2014).
2. One recent article indicates that Americans spend more than 28 hours per
month on the Internet on a computer, nearly 6 hours on online videos, more than 5
hours on mobile videos, and nearly 6 1/2 hours on a gaming console. Sarah Perez,
Nielsen: TV Still King in Media Consumption; Only 16 Percent Of TV Homes Have
Tablets, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 7, 2013), http://techcrunch .com/2013/01/07/nielsen-tvstill-king-in-media-consumption-only-16-percent-of-tv-homes-have-tablets/ [http:
//perma.cc/3VKB-RDDQ] (archived Mar. 4, 2014). A different study notes that
American adults spend a little more than 5 hours per day on digital media. Alexis
Kleinman, Americans Will Spend More Time on Digital Devices Than Watching TV
This Year: Research, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2013/08/01/tv-digital-devices_n_3691196.html [http://perma.cc/474A-U3ZV]
(archived Feb. 24, 2014).
3. Internet Use Over Time, PEW INTERNET, http://www.pewinternet.org/datatrend/internet-use/internet-use-over-time (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) [http://perma
.cc/QA4M-VDCP] (archived Mar. 12, 2014). Close to 300 million total Americans
use the Internet. Chelsea Ray, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: A Proposal for Handling
Digital Assets After Death, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 583, 586 (2013) (putting
the number at 289,309,000).
4. David Mielach, Americans Spend 23 Hours Per Week Online, Texting, BUS.
NEWS DAILY (Jul. 2, 2013, 12:14 PM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4718weekly-online-social-media-time.html [http://perma.cc/3B2U-5ACX] (archived Feb.
24, 2014). See also Jamie P. Hopkins, Afterlife in the Cloud: Managing a Digital
Estate, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 209, 217 (2013) (stating that the average U.S.
internet user spends almost 68 hours per month online).
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year olds and 92% of 30 to 49 year olds use the Internet.5 More than
75% of Internet users check their e-mail, texts, Facebook, and
Instagram every day.6 Almost inadvertently, America has begun to
lean more and more toward a predominantly digital culture,7 and many
predict that this trend is going to continue.8 This interaction with
computers9 has impacted American society and the law, and in many
circumstances, the law, still set in the pen and ink era, simply fails to

5. Internet Use Over Time, supra note 3. Although recent studies show that
92% of Americans have an online presence by the time they are two years old, Maria
Perrone, Comment, What Happens When We Die: Estate Planning of Digital Assets,
21 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 185, 185 (2012), those over the age of 65 are a fastgrowing population of online users. Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, Digital
Planning: The Future of Elder Law, 9 NAELA J. 135, 136 (2013) [hereinafter Beyer
& Cahn, Digital Planning]. The latter group also spends more money on technology
and online shopping than any other demographic. David Goldman & Charles
Jamison, The Future of Estate Planning: The Multigenerational Life Plan, 5 EST.
PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 1, 9 (2012).
6. Mielach, supra note 4.
7. EVAN CARROLL & JOHN ROMANO, YOUR DIGITAL AFTERLIFE: WHEN
FACEBOOK, FLICKR AND TWITTER ARE YOUR ESTATE, WHAT’S YOUR LEGACY? 2
(2011).
8. Frank S. Baldino, Estate Planning and Administration for Digital Assets,
MD. B.J., Nov./Dec. 2012, at 28, 29; Tom H. Cantrill, Jean Gordon Carter, J. William
Gray, Jr., Katherine E. Ramsey & Michael Anderson, Tweeting from Beyond: What
Happens to Your Digital Assets When You Are Gone?, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=073d2e08-93c2-414e-acee-144bc
058bef1 [http://perma.cc/WD9V-VNML] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (“[W]ith each
passing year more of your life goes digital and in increasingly complex ways.”); John
Conner, Comment, Digital Life After Death: The Issue of Planning for a Person’s
Digital Assets After Death, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 301, 314−15
(2011) (after providing statistics from 2010, claiming that “[p]erhaps the most
interesting thing about these numbers is that they continue to grow, and the pace at
which they are growing has not even begun to decline”).
9. In the interest of brevity, this Article uses the term “computer” in the
vernacular sense here and throughout the rest of the Article. From here forward, this
term shall include desktop computers, laptop computers, tablets, and smartphones, as
well as storage hardware like external hard drives, and computer media like CDs,
DVDs, flash drives, etc.
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keep pace with technology.10 Such is the case with regard to one’s
digital footprint at death.11
A “digital footprint,” for purposes of this Article, is broadly
defined to collectively include any and all files and accounts, whether
stored locally or online.12 This includes any digital item such as a
person’s digital information, digital assets, digital accounts, and digital
estate.13 Digital items may simply be the means by which to access
10. Noam Kutler, Protecting Your Online You: A New Approach to Handling Your
Online Persona After Death, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1641, 1651 (2011) (“The use of
the Internet has exploded in recent years, leaving the law to catch up with many new
issues.”); Gerry W. Beyer, Estate Planning in the Digital Age 1 (2013) (working paper),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2166422 (“[T]he pace of technology is faster than
the law can adapt.”); Stephen S. Wu, Digital Afterlife: What Happens to Your Data
When You Die? 4 (2013), available at http://dataedge.ischool.berkeley.edu/2013
/pdf/digital-afterlife-white-paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/7UBU-S7FS] (archived Feb. 24,
2014) (“Technology is always far ahead of the progress of the law . . . .”).
11. Rachel Ehrenberg, Computer Scientists Grapple with How to Manage the
Digital Legacy of the Departed, SCIENCENEWS (June 10, 2013, 10:19 AM),
http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/350909/description/Computer_scientists
_grapple_with_how_to_manage_the_digital_legacy_of_the_departed [http://perma
.cc/EB44-MHJC] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (“But communication and privacy laws have
yet to catch up with technology.”); CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 57 (“[O]ur
cultural and legal mechanisms for passing along assets haven’t changed to include
digital assets.”). Of course, this issue is not limited to America. See, e.g., Tobi Cohen,
Lawyers Raise Questions About Digital Data Rights After the Owner’s Death,
CANADA.COM (Aug. 20, 2013, 4:48 PM), http://o.canada.com/news/national/lawyersraise-questions-about-digital-data-rights-after-the-owners-death/
[http://perma.cc
/EZ5G-9XSK] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (discussing the issue from a Canadian
perspective); Gerry W. Beyer, Who Gets Access to Your Facebook When You Die?,
WILLS, TR. & EST. PROF BLOG (Aug. 20, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com
/trusts_estates_prof/2013/08/who-gets-access-to-your-facebook-when-you-die.html
[http://perma.cc/8A4G-M6HG] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (discussing Asia and
Europe).
12. I have chosen the term “digital footprint” purposefully and defined it herein
to avoid inadvertently narrowing the scope of this Article by the use of such terms as
“digital information,” “digital asset,” “digital account,” or “digital estate.”
13. “Digital information” has been defined as “representative of (or enables
control over) traditional forms of intangible personal property such as bank and
brokerage accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds and other intangible investments for
which the record-keeping, reporting or management functions are online, either in
part or in whole.” Christopher D. Fidler, Tools for Digital Assets and Digital
Information, LEXOLOGY (June 5, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail
.aspx?g=00651ac6-d3b0-480a-adf8-a73f868f7eab [http://perma.cc/9HT2-PCNA]
(archived Feb. 24, 2014). As commentators have recognized, there is no current
definition of “digital assets” that is clear and universal. Conner, supra note 8, at 303;
Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Happens to our Facebook Accounts When We Die?:
Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-Media Assets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L.
REV. 185, 207 (2012) (noting that the term “is already vague” and “is continuously
broadening to incorporate once-tangible assets now undergoing complete digitization,
as well as previously unforeseen cyber innovations”); Perrone, supra note 5, at 188
(explaining that there is no universal definition of the term); Beyer, supra note 10
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other digital items, like e-mail, for example, or they may be collections
(of photographs, videos, documents, books, music, or other things),
social media accounts, or other materials that are not valuable per se
but are irreplaceable from a sentimental standpoint. Digital items may
be financial in nature from a personal or business standpoint. Although
one may not realize or appreciate the value of his digital footprint, it
could comprise a significant portion of his entire patrimony. In fact, a
recent study showed that the average American values his digital
footprint at nearly $55,000.14 Digital items can also be quite unusual,
such as the $17,000 virtual sword used in an online game.15
(noting that there is no well-established definition). Further, others have offered
different definitions of the term, with varying scope in each. See, e.g., Gerry W.
Beyer & Naomi Cahn, When You Pass On, Don’t Leave The Passwords Behind,
PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 2012, at 3 [hereinafter Beyer & Cahn, When You Pass On];
Tim Grant, ‘Digital Assets’: The New Frontier for Estate Planning, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (May 13, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/busi
ness/legal/digital-assets-the-new-frontier-for-estate-planning-687401 [http://perma
.cc/4G8Y-Y845] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (defining “digital assets” as “any work or
possessions stored on a computer and the Internet”); Rochelle L. Haller, Web of
Estate Planning Considerations for Digital Assets, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c301f729-258b-42a4-bf8b-673b2
30a0698 [http://perma.cc/Y6EL-QCKF] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (defining “digital
assets” as “electronic content; information or media; and the right to use that content,
information, or media”); Fidler, supra (defining “interests in property capable of
being divided or distributed, such as digital media in the form of text, photograph,
music, and video files, websites and domain names, and to the extent legal ownership
can be established, web-based media including e-mail accounts, social media and
blogs”); Evan Carroll et al., Digital Assets: A Clearer Definition, DIGITAL EST.
RESOURCE (Jan. 30, 2012), http://commcns.org/13IjiL5 [http://perma.cc/9HMZZ92M] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (defining “digital assets” as the actual files stored in
digital form). “Digital account” has been defined as access rights to digital accounts.
Id. “Digital estate” has been defined as a person’s collective digital assets. Conner,
supra note 8, at 305. See also Perrone, supra note 5, at 186 (defining “digital estate”
as the culmination of digital assets). The term “digital footprint” is obviously broader
than “digital information.” It is also broader than “digital asset,” although the two are
similar, particularly when comparing the broadest definition of the former. It is
roughly equivalent to “digital estate” except that the latter’s incorporation of the term
“digital asset” in its definition generates scope issues. The intent in using “digital
footprint” and the definition provided for it is to include all items that would also
qualify under the definitions of “digital information,” “digital asset,” “digital
account,” and “digital estate.”
14. Steven Maimes, Managing Your Digital Afterlife: Cyber Footprint,
Ownership, and Access, TRUST ADVISOR (Jan. 28, 2013), http://thetrustadvisor
.com/tag/digital-estate-planning [http://perma.cc/5BW3-QLWJ] (archived Mar. 4,
2014). American Internet users have more digital items than the average world user.
Hopkins, supra note 4, at 221.
15. Arden Dale, More Estate Plans Account for ‘Digital Assets’, WALL ST. J.
(June 13, 2013, 9:19 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873237
34304578543151391292038.html.
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A recent survey indicates that a majority of Americans have not
planned for their digital footprints upon death.16 For most people,
doing so is “a forgotten and neglected death-related obligation.”17 Even
for those who are aware of and remember the issue, there are other
reasons for their lack of planning. Some are nervous about the idea of
sharing all of their log-in information prior to death.18 Some do not
value their digital items enough to incorporate them into an estate
plan.19 For others, “[t]he sheer magnitude of [their] digital lives can
overwhelm [them] into inaction.”20
The failure to include one’s digital footprint in an estate plan
renders the plan incomplete. Lack of planning, in turn, means that
one’s successors cannot know with any certainty what the decedent
would have wanted to happen to his digital footprint, which could
leave digital items “adrift in cyberspace.”21 The interests of various
groups of people lead to competing policies about whether access to a
16. Catey Hill, 5 Steps to Creating Your Digital Estate Plan, NEXTAVENUE (Apr.
12, 2013), http://www.nextavenue.org/article/2012-05/5-steps-creating-your-digitalestate-plan [http://perma.cc/6NTY-D93U] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (stating that 63%
have not made a plan for their digital footprint); Goldman & Jamison, supra note 5, at
11 (stating that 57% have not). Some polls indicate that this number is slightly
smaller for “high-net-worth people.” Paul Sullivan, Leaving Behind the Digital Keys
to Financial Lives, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013
/05/25/your-money/forgotten-in-estate-planning-online-passwords.html?nl=todays
headlines&emc=edit_th_20130525&_r=2& [http://perma.cc/45HU-SM5K] (archived
Feb. 24, 2014). For that matter, most Americans do not plan for their death at all. The
majority of Americans have not executed a will. Grant, supra note 13 (claiming that
61% of Americans have not made a will at their death); Sherry, supra note 13, at 207
(claiming the number is 58%).
17. Maimes, supra note 14. See also Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note
5, at 149 (explaining that many clients have never considered estate planning for their
digital footprints); Conner, supra note 8, at 308 (“People simply do not think about
their digital assets . . . .”).
18. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 150; Sullivan, supra note
16.
19. Michael Walker & Victoria D. Blachly, Virtual Assets, ST0003 ALI-ABA
175, 177 (2011).
20. Rev. Amy Ziettlow & Naomi Cahn, What Does Managing a Loved One’s
Digital Legacy Look Like?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 24, 2013, 4:27 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-amy-ziettlow/what-does-managing-a-love_b
_3461477.html [http://perma.cc/3LR3-2D3P] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). See also
Perrone, supra note 5, at 194 (“[T]he sheer amount of work involved in tracking
every online account and password presents a task that many people consider too
daunting to undertake.”); Ehrenberg, supra note 11.
21. Ray, supra note 3, at 583. See also Samantha Haworth, Laying Your Online
Self to Rest: Evaluating the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, U.
MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2269093 (“When internet users die without planning for their digital
lives, families and estate executors are left to guess the users’ wishes.”).
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decedent’s digital footprint should be allowed or denied.22 The law
does not help. Louisiana, like most states, has no specific legislation in
place to govern a decedent’s digital footprint, leaving traditional legal
principles to govern technological advancements that did not exist and
were probably not even anticipated at the time the laws in question
were written. Thus far, the problems have not reached epic proportions,
but that day is coming. As more transactions occur online, fewer hard
copies exist. Instead, the “[d]ocuments once found in wallets, desks,
and safety deposit boxes are now accessed mainly through email and
website accounts.”23 And as environmental consciousness finds its way
more and more into corporate America and more customers are
encouraged to opt for paperless transactions, digital items will continue
to grow in number and value.24 As that happens and as the most
prolific users of online services start to die in greater numbers,25 the
digital footprint issue will become a serious problem.
With this background in mind, this Article is organized as follows:
Part I provides an overview of some of the most common digital items,
including e-mail, sentimental items (like collections of photographs,
videos, documents, books, and music, as well as social media
accounts), and financial digital items. Part II assesses the various
interests triggered by the digital footprint issue. One such interest is
efficient estate administration, which could affect a decedent’s
succession representative,26 his successors, and in certain
22. Competing interests include (1) efficient estate administration (which affects
decedents’ succession representatives, their successors, and in some situations, their
donees and the donees’ successors by gratuitous title), (2) the privacy interests (of
decedents and those with whom they communicated), (3) the right to information of
those left behind (in some situations), (4) the contractual rights of online service
providers, and (5) the historical preservation interests of society. See infra Part II.
23. Molly Wilkens, Comment, Privacy and Security During Life, Access After
Death: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1037, 1039 (2011).
24. Grant, supra note 13; David H. Ogwyn, Digital Asset Protection and
Planning, LA. B.J., Oct./Nov. 2012, at 208, 209 (“Service providers, including banks,
insurance companies, and various utility agencies, encourage their customers to
switch to paperless statements and online account management.”).
25. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1644 (“[G]iven the relatively young age of the
average internet user, many questions regarding death and rights of succession have
yet to reach the critical mass necessary to garner public attention—but they will
soon.”); Sherry, supra note 13, at 213 (“[N]ot enough people—especially the young
and the will-less—have died to call attention to the questions raised by dead persons’
unnamed social-media accounts.”).
26. This Article uses the term “succession representative” to connote the person
who is in charge of administering the decedent’s estate. See generally LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. art. 2826 (2014). Generally, in Louisiana, that person is an executor named by
the decedent in his testament, and in other cases, an administrator. See generally
FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS § 5.8, in 1A
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 103–08 (2005).
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circumstances in Louisiana, his donees and their successors by
gratuitous title. Yet the privacy interests of the decedent and those with
whom he communicated must be considered as well, along with the
interests of those left behind. Also interested in the issue are the online
service providers (OSPs) that contracted with the decedent when he
created certain digital assets in his digital footprint, as well as society,
which has an interest in the decedent’s digital footprint from a
historical preservation standpoint. Some of these interests weigh in
favor of allowing access to a decedent’s digital footprint; others do not.
Part III addresses the Gordian knot of overlapping and complicated
legal analyses that the digital footprint issue triggers, including (1) the
status of some or all digital items as property, such that they may be
transferred at death; (2) the effect of the OSPs’27 terms of service
(TOS)28 on the transfer of and access to certain digital items; and (3)
the effect of certain federal privacy statutes. Part IV details the
Louisiana approach to the digital footprint issue, which is, as of now,
only estate planning. Louisiana, like the majority of other states,29 has
no legislation or jurisprudence to specifically address the digital
footprint issue. Part V analyzes the various potential resolutions to the
issue (including company policy change, ad hoc judicial action, a
federal statute, a state statute, and a uniform act), and it highlights the
deficiencies of each. Finally, Part VI proposes that both federal and
state action is required to effectively handle the multitude of legal
issues triggered by the digital footprint. On the federal level, it suggests
that Congress (1) amend existing federal statutes to ensure that one
accessing a decedent’s digital footprint is not unintentionally breaking
the law and (2) enact a federal enabling statute to mandate that OSPs
follow the digital footprint laws of the states. On the state level, Part VI
27. “Each online service provider has its own terms of service—the legal
mumbo-jumbo you click through when you open your account . . . .” Eleanor Laise,
Protect Digital Assets After Your Death, KIPLINGER (May 2013), http://www
.kiplinger.com/article/retirement/T021-C000-S004-protect-digital-as sets-after-yourdeath.html [http://perma.cc/7ZX4-A3LW] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). The TOS always
exist and vary from provider to provider, making it nearly impossible for one with a
large digital footprint to know his rights. Perrone, supra note 5, at 190; Kutler, supra
note 10, at 1648–49. Also, many sites unilaterally amend their terms on a regular
basis, creating quite a burden for a user who tries to stay abreast of his rights. Id.
28. They are also sometimes referred to as “clickwrap agreements,” Beyer &
Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 37, or “browsewrap agreements,” Kutler,
supra note 10, at 1646.
29. Grant, supra note 13. See also Naomi Cahn, Postmortem Life On-Line, PROB.
& PROP., July/Aug. (2011), at 36, 37–38; Nicole Schneider, Social Media Wills—
Protecting Digital Assets, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, June 2013, at 16, 16 (“Currently, there
exists almost no legally binding precedent for including digital assets as part of an
estate without explicit directions in a will or trust.”); Haworth, supra note 21, at 6
(“Reported case law on how these different types of digital assets are being accessed
and distributed through the probate system is nearly nonexistent at this time.”).
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offers a detailed statutory scheme to govern the digital footprints of
both testate and intestate decedents. Ultimately, it suggests that
Louisiana should avoid the “one-size-fits-all” approach to the digital
footprint issue followed in existing legislation in other states and in the
draft of the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act. Instead, it
suggests that Louisiana consider the strength of interests triggered by
different digital items and enact legislation that appropriately reflects
that consideration by treating each digital item differently.
I. DIGITAL ITEMS IN A DIGITAL FOOTPRINT
Because one’s digital footprint is defined so broadly, one
commentator aptly noted that its scope is “utterly mindboggling.”30
Digital items can be stored locally or online or both. Some, like e-mail,
can be used to access other digital items. Some hold sentimental value,
while others are better classified as financial in nature.31
A. The Digital Item Used to Access Other Digital Items: E-mail
Accounts
E-mail, a unique and personal identifier, is, of course, in digital
form itself. Americans now use their e-mail accounts in a variety of
ways, including the traditional way of communicating with others. Yet,
an e-mail account also serves as the means to reset passwords to other
online accounts, and thus, it is an important index of most online
activity.32 As a result, one’s e-mail account has been referred to as the
master key to locating and accessing many other digital items.33 After
all, “[o]nline statements, notifications, messages, paperless bills etc.,
will all come through to the decedent’s emails. Moreover, the
decedent’s address book and calendar are often tied to or stored within
the email account.”34 Therefore, access to a decedent’s e-mail account
is extremely important. Without it, a succession representative may be
30. Ray, supra note 3, at 586. See also Beyer, supra note 10, at 2 (stating that the
number of digital items one person owns or controls is “virtually endless”).
31. Note that this classification scheme is not an exact science because—as will
become obvious—some digital items arguably belong in more than one category.
Note also that other legal scholars have grouped them differently. Some have grouped
them as “personal, social media, financial, and business.” See Cahn, supra note 29.
Others have grouped them as stored locally or stored elsewhere and then included
sub-groups within each group. See Sherry, supra note 13, at 195.
32. Carroll et al., supra note 13.
33. Maimes, supra note 14; Sherry, supra note 13, at 196.
34. Neeli G. Shah, Disposition of Digital Assets: Reasons for Digital Estate
Planning, LEXOLOGY (May 8, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail
.aspx?g=220d8c0f-b689-4bbf-95bf-67a1ad741c14 [http://perma.cc/9GSS-WCC8]
(archived Feb. 24, 2014).
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unable to obtain information about a decedent’s other digital items,
which may, in turn, mean that the succession representative will be
unaware of their existence.35
Trillions of e-mails are sent each year,36 and billions are sent
daily.37 Seventy-five percent of working American adults have at least
one personal e-mail address, and 59% have at least one work e-mail
address.38 Although some e-mail programs are local, many of the most
popular e-mail services, like Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo!,39 are webbased, meaning that copies of the e-mails are not downloaded onto the
computer and the content in the accounts is accessible only through the
accounts themselves.40
B. Digital Items of Sentimental Value: Collections and Social Media
Accounts
An e-mail account can also be used to unlock one’s sentimental
digital assets, including collections of photographs and videos,
documents, books, music, and other collections that can be stored
either on a computer or through an online account. It can also be used
to unlock social media accounts (on which people can also store other
digital items).41 All of these digital items may be valuable to a
decedent’s survivors, even if only in the sentimental sense. As one
industry expert explained: “If you’ve lost someone, you cling to

35. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1054.
36. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 220.
37. Sherry, supra note 13, at 186; CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 38.
38. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1046. Twenty percent of young adults have three
or more e-mail accounts. Id.
39.
There are no uniform statistics comparing the user numbers of the
different web-based email address providers. Nevertheless, there is
enough information available to make some statements about the
popularity of different services. The big three are Microsoft’s Hotmail
(now called Windows Live Hotmail), Yahoo! Mail and Gmail, together
accounting for well over 1 billion users.
Mark Brownlow, Email and Webmail Statistics, EMAIL MARKETING REP. (Dec.
2012), http://www.email-marketing-reports.com/metrics/email-statistics.htm [http:
//perma.cc/FF49-S8T8] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). Although the providers claim
higher numbers, a Comscore study indicates that Gmail has 288 million users,
Hotmail, 286 million, and Yahoo! mail, 282 million. Id.
40. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1046.
41. By way of example, there are more than 250 million photographs uploaded to
Facebook each day. Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643,
1647 (2012) [hereinafter Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife].
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everything they may have had. You realize that even the most
pedestrian items become very meaningful after someone is gone.”42
Seemingly gone are the days when people would routinely print
out photographs and save video cassette recorder tapes. Instead, many
people store their photographs and videos solely in digital form,43
either by saving them locally or online, often with websites such as
Flickr,44 Shutterfly,45 Snapfish,46 Photobucket,47 or YouTube.48 Many
42. Maimes, supra note 14 (quoting Evan Carroll of THE DIGITAL BEYOND,
http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Perrone, supra note 5, at 198 (explaining that “a person’s digital presence can, after
death, provide meaning to those still living”).
43. Gerry W. Beyer & Kerri M. Griffin, Estate Planning for Digital Assets, EST.
PLAN. STUD., July 2011, at 3, available at http://www.floridaprobatecounsel
.com/wp-content/uploads/docs/Estate-Planning/Estate-Planning-For-Digital-Assets
.pdf [http://perma.cc/67ZX-P56C] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (explaining that “[t]oday,
this material [like special pictures, letters, and journals] is stored on computers or
online and is often never printed”); Tyler G. Tarney, Comment, A Call for Legislation
to Permit the Transfer of Digital Assets at Death, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 773, 777 (2012)
(“As the world becomes more dependent on technology, it is becoming more likely
that the only copies of these pictures remain within password-protected accounts.”);
Sherry, supra note 13, at 203 (“Notably, cloud services like Flickr and Snapfish mean
that companies like Yahoo! often become the sole home for many people’s photos.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
44. “Flickr, founded in 2004 and owned by Yahoo!, claims to be the largest
photo-sharing site on the internet.” Sherry, supra note 13, at 202. Flickr hosts
approximately 87 million users and 8 billion images. Craig Smith, How Many People
Use 378 of the Top Social Media, Apps & Tools? (February 2014), DIGITAL
MARKETING RAMBLINGS (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.expandedramblings.com
/index.php/resource-how-many-people-use-the-top-social-media/ [http://perma.cc
/W5YU-9H5Y] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
45. Shutterfly has 35 million users and 18 billion photos on its site. Here’s How
We Think of Shutterfly’s Stock Value, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 1, 2013, 5:40 PM),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/1241641-heres-how-we-think-of-shutterflys-stockvalue [http://perma.cc/9WZA-D3CK] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). In 2012, billions of
Kodak Gallery photos were moved to Shutterfly when Kodak closed the gallery. Id.
46. Snapfish was formed in 2000, CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 28, and
now claims 90 million users and 2 billion photos. Welcome, SNAPFISH,
http://www.snapfish.com/snapfish/aboutUs (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [http://perma
.cc/YEA5-HR4R] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
47. Photobucket claims 23 million monthly American users who upload more
than 4 million images and videos each day. About Photobucket, PHOTOBUCKET,
http://photobucket.com/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [http://perma.cc/A2WK3DB4] (archived Mar. 4, 2014).
48. YouTube was founded in 2005 as a video-sharing site, Sherry, supra note 13,
at 203, and today there are approximately 1 billion users each month, Statistics,
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited Oct. 22,
2013) [http://perma.cc/WDV5-PU29] (archived Feb. 24, 2014), and 120 billion
videos on YouTube. Maimes, supra note 14. More than 800 million users access the
site every month, Hopkins, supra note 4, at 218, and two-thirds of all Internet users
check YouTube daily. Mielach, supra note 4. Users upload numerous hours of video
every minute. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1666 (putting the
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also store and share various types of documents in digital form, either
locally or online through Google Docs,49 Scribd,50 or Dropbox.51
Computers and online accounts also hold various types of collections
in digital form. For example, many have virtual libraries on a Nook or
Kindle52 and music on iTunes53 or Pandora.54
Social media accounts may also be classified as sentimental digital
items. Some claim that these accounts have replaced diaries,55 despite
the fact that social media involves interactions with others.56
Americans have fervently embraced social networking in the past
decade57 and now spend about 16 minutes of every hour online on this
number at 60 hours every minute); Sherry, supra note 13 (putting the number at 48
every minute); Hopkins, supra note 4, at 218 (putting the number at 24 every minute).
YouTube is an excellent example of the overlapping nature of these categories, as
first mentioned supra note 31. While YouTube is classified herein as a digital item of
a sentimental nature, it can be financially valuable under the YouTube Partner
Program. Sherry, supra note 13, at 203. Per this program, “YouTube runs
advertisements across partners’ videos or makes them available for rent, then gives
the ‘majority’ of the ad-generated money to the partners.” Id. at 203.
49. All Gmail users have access to GoogleDocs. See supra note 39 for the
number of Gmail users.
50. Scribd has approximately 80 million monthly users. About Us, SCRIBD,
http://www.scribd.com/about (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) [http://perma.cc/97R27JHR] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
51. Dropbox has more than 200 million users. What is Dropbox?,
DROPBOX.COM, https://www.dropbox.com/news/company-info (last visited Oct. 22,
2013) [http://perma.cc/P483-VDMJ] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
52. Kindle has 17.4 million active users just in the United States. 17.4 Million
Active Kindle Fire Users in US, 30.5 Million Active iPad Users, NEWZOO (Apr. 19,
2012), http://www.newzoo.com/press-releases/17-4-million-active-kindle-fire-users-inus-30-5-million-active-ipad-users/ [http://perma.cc/6SPC-PLRP] (archived Feb. 24,
2014).
53. iTunes claims 575 million users. Daniel Eran Dilger, Apple Now Adding
500,000 New iTunes Accounts Per Day, APPLE INSIDER (June 13, 2013, 9:48 PM),
http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/06/14/apple-now-adding-500000-new-itunesaccounts-per-day [http://perma.cc/K36Y-FMKP] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
54. Pandora has more than 71 million users. Ryan Faughnder, Pandora Reports
2nd-Quarter Sales Growth, Will End Listening Cap, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013, 3:51
PM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-pandora-earnings
-20130822,0,619681.story [http://perma.cc/5YZL-ENDB] (archived Mar. 4, 2014);
Pandora Removes 40-Hour-Per-Month Limit On Free Mobile Listening, PANDORA
(Aug. 22, 2013), http://investor.pandora.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=227956&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1849420&highlight= [http://perma.cc/9J9Z-NE2L] (archived Feb. 24,
2014).
55. Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 3; Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra
note 5, at 140; Jason Mazzone, The Right to Die Online, 16 No. 9 J. INTERNET L. 1, 13
(2013) [hereinafter Mazzone, The Right to Die Online].
56. Cahn, supra note 29, at 37.
57. Businesses use social media, partly because advertising there is less
expensive. Tarney, supra note 43, at 778.
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activity.58 This includes sites such as Facebook,59 Google+,60 Twitter,61
LinkedIn,62 MySpace,63 Instagram,64 and Snapchat,65 as well as
accounts and avatars created to participate in online games—like

58. Matt Tatham, For Every Hour Online Americans Spend 16 Minutes on Social
Networks, EXPERIAN (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.experian.com/blogs/marketingforward/2013/04/18/for-every-hour-online-americans-spend-16-min utes-on-socialnetworks/ [http://perma.cc/4G6X-AYAY] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). Another source
claims that internet users spend almost 20% of their online time on social media sites.
Hopkins, supra note 4, at 217.
59. Although relatively young, this site currently boasts more than one billion
active monthly users. Newsroom: Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom
.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [http://perma.cc/8FFG-NTQ8]
(archived Mar. 4, 2014). This is one in seven people on the planet. Mazzone, The
Right to Die Online, supra note 55, at 13. If Facebook were a country, its population
would be the third largest in the world. CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 134.
60. As of December 2012, Google+ had 343 million active users. Stephen J.
Vaughn-Nichols, Google+ Moves up to Second Place in Social Networks, ZDNET
(Jan. 26, 2013, 9:27 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/google-moves-up-to-second-placein-social-networks-7000010372/ [http://perma.cc/9U55-U9TK] (archived Feb. 24,
2014). Nearly 60% of Google+ users check it daily. Mielach, supra note 4.
61. Twitter is a microblogging application allowing users to post no more than 140
characters at a time. Sherry, supra note 13, at 201−02. It is used by 18% of American
adults, Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW INTERNET,http://www .pewinternet.org/factsheets/social-networking-fact-sheet (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) [http://perma.cc/5HKKMGQV] (archived Mar. 12, 2014), and according to one source, it boasts 200 million
accounts and 230 million tweets per day. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41,
at 1667. Twitter itself claims to have more than 645 million users. Twitter Statistics,
STATISTICS BRAIN (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.statisticbrain.com/twitter-statistics/
[http://perma.cc/JQH4-C3RT] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
62. This is the largest online professional network with 259 million members,
Sherry, supra note 13, at 202, 40% of whom check in daily, Mielach, supra note 4.
LinkedIn itself claims 238 million users. About LinkedIn, LINKEDIN, http://press
.linkedin.com/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [http://perma.cc/9QK5-X99H]
(archived Mar. 4, 2014).
63. MySpace has 25 million users, John Bowman, Myspace’s $20M Relaunch
Deletes Its Remaining Users’ Blogs, CBCNEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/newsblogs
/yourcommunity/2013/06/myspaces-20m-relaunch-deletes-its-remaining-users-blogs
.html (last updated June 13, 2013) [http://perma.cc/Y7ZG-LFDV] (archived Feb. 24,
2014), and draws a younger crowd than does Facebook. Sherry, supra note 13, at 201.
In addition to its social networking function, millions of artists use MySpace’s
popular music section to post and sell music. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra
note 41, at 1663.
64. Instragram has 150 million users, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/press/
(last visited Jan. 20, 2014), 70% of whom log in daily. Mielach, supra note 4.
65. Snapchat has more than 8 million American adult users, and more than 200
million snaps are exchanged per day. Jennifer Van Grove, Snapchat Snapshot: App
Counts 8M Adult Users in U.S., C|NET (June 25, 2013, 11:54 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57590968-93/snapchat-snapshot-app-counts-8madult-users-in-u.s/ [http://perma.cc/8MXC-92F6] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
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World of Warcraft66 and Entropia Universe—and virtual, threedimensional worlds like Second Life.67
C. Digital Items of a Financial Nature
Certain digital items offer the ability to manage, spend, or earn
money and, therefore, can be classified as financial in nature.68
Accounts in online games are potential financial digital items,69 as are
online accounts linked to bank accounts, college funds, brokerage
accounts, retirement plans, credit cards, loans, and insurance
accounts.70 PayPal and online shopping sites like Amazon71 and eBay72
are also classified as financial in nature,73 as well as customer rewards
66. Approximately 8.3 million users play World of Warcraft. Charles Arthur,
World of Warcraft: Is It Losing the Battle for Subscribers?, GUARDIAN (May 9, 2013,
10:28 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/shortcuts/2013/may/09/world-ofwarcraft-losing-battle-subscribers [http://perma.cc/BWR6-8FGV] (archived Feb. 24,
2014).
67. Second Life has 33 million users. Daniel Voyager, Second Life Statistics
2013 Spring Update, DANIEL VOYAGER’S BLOG (Apr. 2, 2013), http://Daniel
voyager.wordpress.com/2013/04/02/second-life-statistics-2013-spring-update/ [http:
//perma.cc/5RQF-K6KT] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). Note, though, that although
Second Life involves interaction with others and thus could be considered social
networking, some argue its primary function is a virtual gaming site. Sherry, supra
note 13, at 234–35.
68. CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 151–53.
69. Though few would expect it, online games can be valuable digital assets that
generate income. For example, one Second Life landholder, Anshe Chung, has virtual
real estate holdings valued at more than $1 million. Wu, supra note 10, at 1.
70. Nearly half of all adult Americans with access to the Internet pay their bills
online because of the convenience and independence of doing so. Wilkens, supra note
23, at 1039. Further, the number of Internet users who conduct financial transactions
online is increasing in every age group, with the 70- to 75-year-old age group
responsible for the biggest increase since 2005. Id. at 1055.
71. Jessica Kril, Statistics and Facts About Online Shopping, STATISTA: THE
STATISTICS PORTAL, http://www.statista.com/topics/871/online-shopping/ (last visited
Nov. 11, 2013) [http://perma.cc/89VV-XB28] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). In 2012,
Amazon reportedly had approximately 182 million active customers. Owen Thomas,
Amazon Has an Estimated 10 Million Members for Its Surprisingly Profitable Prime
Club, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 11, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/amazon-prime-10-million-members-morningstar-2013-3 [http://perma
.cc/DA4N-QHC7] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
72. “eBay is the world’s largest online marketplace, facilitating an estimated
$2,000 in sales every second.” Sherry, supra note 13, at 204.
73. Americans spend about five minutes of every hour shopping online, Tatham,
supra note 58, and it is predicted that Americans will spend $327 billion on it in
2016, up from $202 billion in 2011. Goldman & Jamison, supra note 5. It has been
estimated that nearly 70% of all American Internet users purchased an item online in
2011. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 216. Some even have “digital wallet” applications on
their cell phones that let users pay for products from their phones. Hill, supra note 16.
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programs.74 Likewise, some blogs and domain names qualify as
financial digital items. While most of the 40 million blogs on the
Internet75 have little or no financial value, some generate significant
revenue.76 For example, in November of 2011, the most valuable blog,
Gawker.com, was valued at $318 million.77 Like blogs, domain names
can also be quite profitable.78
As more businesses embrace online life, they too obtain digital
items that are classified as financial. In some situations, the business
itself may exist only online, like virtual businesses, online auction
houses, and eBay sellers. In others, a physical business may have
digital items because it stores information, such as client lists, customer
orders and preferences, customer contact information, and employee
payroll accounts, in digital format. Some business owners, like
computer programmers, graphic or web designers, photographers,
authors, musicians, and artists, may sell products that are created or
74. Many Americans have taken advantage of the plethora of loyalty programs
like frequent flier, banking rewards, shopping rewards, and many others. One study
reports that outstanding loyalty points had an estimated total value of $50 billion in
2011. Beyer, Estate Planning, supra note 10, at 2. Some may amass a significant
number of points or miles and die without having spent them. Grant, supra note 13.
For example, some report members acquiring at least 3.5 trillion in unused miles.
Beyer, Estate Planning, supra note 10, at 2.
75. Maimes, supra note 14. Many of them are housed on blog host websites like
WordPress, Blogger, LiveJournal, and TypePad.
76. This revenue comes, in large part, from paid advertisements or subscription
sales. Haller, supra note 13.
77. Id. As of 2011, other valuable blogs include: Drudge Report ($93 million),
Popsugar Media Network ($64 million), SB Nation ($56 million), Macrumors ($52
million), Business Insider ($45 million), Seeking Alpha ($45 million), Cheezburger
Nation ($41 million), Mashable ($39 million), and Gigaom ($32 million). The 10
Most Valuable Blogs in 2011, ATLANTIC (Nov. 1, 2011, 3:09 PM), http://www
.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/the-10-most-valuable-blogs-in-2011/24
706/ [http://perma.cc/AT9D-Q6SD] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). “America’s top ten
most valuable blogs had an estimated aggregate value of $785 million.” Haller, supra
note 13.
78. Domain names are identification strings used to identify the location of a
particular website and include URLs from sites like GoDaddy.com and Network
Solutions. Haller, supra note 13. The domain name “Porn.com” sold in 2007 for $9.5
million; “Insure.com” sold in 2009 for $16 million, and “Sex.com” sold in 2010 for
$14 million. Beyer, Estate Planning, supra note 10, at 3. But see Haller, supra note
13 (asserting that “Sex.com” sold for $13 million in 2010 after selling for $14 million
in 2006). “Hotels.com” sold in 2001 for $11 million. Haworth, supra note 21, at 34.
See World’s Top 10 Most Expensive Domain Names, MOST EXPENSIVE J.,
http://most-expensive.com/domain-name (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [http://perma
.cc/LKK2-QYDC] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). A domain name can depreciate quickly,
and lack of knowledge of a decedent’s ownership of a domain name could cause a
missed renewal deadline. Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 3. Valuable domain
names can have people “waiting to jump on them when the lease expires.” Marshall,
supra note 1 (citing estate planning attorney James Lamm).
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stored in digital form. These digital products may have additional value
as intellectual property.79
II. COMPETING INTERESTS TRIGGERED BY A DECEDENT’S DIGITAL
FOOTPRINT
Computers and the Internet offer a convenient mode of
communicating, storing sentimental items, and transacting financial
affairs during life. However, when a person dies, figuring out what to
do with his digital footprint is inconvenient for those left behind. A
decedent’s online activities can muddy estate administration, such that
successors and others have a strong interest in accessing the decedent’s
digital footprint. Nevertheless, that interest must be balanced against
the privacy rights of the decedent and others, which militate against
access. As one commentator predicted, “The clash between privacy
laws and estate administration is fast approaching.”80 Meanwhile, the
important interests of OSPs, which disfavor access, and society, which
favors access, must also be considered.
A. Estate Administration Interests
A decedent’s digital footprint can complicate his estate
administration for numerous individuals and groups of people. The
first affected individual is the decedent’s succession representative,
who faces the tasks of learning of, locating, and (legally) accessing the
decedent’s digital items. Another affected group is the decedent’s
successors, who could be forced to deal with the decedent’s identity
theft and, in some situations, the theft of content of the estate. As if
these issues, which affect estate administration in all states, are not
enough, in Louisiana, other people may be affected due to forced
heirship. The interests of all of these groups of people lean in favor of
allowing access to a decedent’s digital footprint.
1. Decedent’s Succession Representative
A decedent’s succession representative faces the daunting task of
marshaling, inventorying, and distributing the decedent’s assets81 and
is encouraged to do so as quickly as possible.82 This task proves
difficult with regard to incorporeal property like digital items, as they

79.
80.
81.
82.

Haller, supra note 13.
Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1055.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3191 (2014).
Id. art. 3197.
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are harder to learn of, locate, and access.83 Of course, the more
expansive one’s digital footprint, the more difficult it is to effectively
administer his estate. Nevertheless, a succession representative bears
the implicit duties of avoiding wastage and safeguarding against the
destruction of the decedent’s property.84
To determine what to do with a decedent’s digital footprint, the
succession representative must first learn what digital items comprise
it. If the decedent dies intestate or with a will that is silent as to digital
items, the succession representative may be unaware of them, which
will make these items difficult if not impossible to discover.85 After all,
the succession representative cannot find them “by rifling through a
desk anymore . . . because they’re online.”86 And, of course, if
knowledge of a decedent’s digital items lies solely with the decedent,
that knowledge and the digital items themselves could disappear
entirely upon his death.87
Gaining awareness of the decedent’s digital items is only the first
step; a succession representative must then locate them. The difficulty
in doing so lies in the fact that people do not typically store their digital
footprints neatly in one place. Instead, they typically store digital items
on multiple computers, e-mail accounts, and through other online
accounts.88 As scholars have aptly noted, “Sorting through a
deceased’s online life for the important things can be just as daunting
as cleaning out the house of a hoarder.”89
83. See LA. CIV. CODE. art. 461 (2014) (“Incorporeals are things that have no
body, but are comprehended by the understanding, such as the rights of inheritance,
servitudes, obligations, and right of intellectual property.”).
84. Sherry, supra note 13, at 239.
85. Haller, supra note 13.
86. Kelly Greene, Passing Down Digital Assets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2012,
8:20 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904437137045776015
24091363102.html [http://perma.cc/5BT9-FTQ3] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (quoting
estate planning attorney William Schmidt). Most people do not print out hard copies
of their digital items. Martin W. O’Toole, Doing Estate Planning When the Fog Has
Only Partially Lifted, 2012 WL 191161, at *12. What succession representatives have
to do is search through decedent’s hard copy papers, collect his mail, look at his
computer, talk to his family and friends, and look at tax forms, particularly the 1099INT. Baldino, supra note 8, at 31. Tax forms may prove less helpful as time passes.
Already, some tax forms, like the W-2, are moving online, and taxes can be filed
online. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1047. The 1099-INT may suffer that fate
eventually. Id. Also, since the 1099-INT is sent in January or February, there may be
lag time between the death and the receipt of the form. Id. Further, if the account in
question is not interest-paying, locating it may be even more difficult. Baldino, supra
note 8, at 31.
87. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1046.
88. Id. at 1039, 1046.
89. Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 2; Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra
note 5, at 139.
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Once a succession representative learns of and locates the
decedent’s digital items, he must then access them, which can be
inordinately difficult for a variety of reasons. First of all, chances are
that the decedent has protected his digital items with passwords. Likely
driven by threats to privacy and the possibility of identity theft, most
people choose complicated passwords, change them frequently, and
keep them secret.90 The more sophisticated person utilizes different
usernames, passwords, and security questions for each digital item.91
The result of all of this self-protection is that many decedents
inadvertently lock their succession representatives out of their digital
footprints.
Even where a decedent has left behind a list of digital items,
usernames, and passwords, a succession representative may face other
barriers to access. For example, as will be discussed in Part III, the
TOS that the decedent agreed to when creating certain digital items
seemingly bars his succession representative from accessing them, as
do some federal privacy laws. If the succession representative cannot
access the decedent’s digital items, then important bills may go unpaid,
valuable assets may be overlooked, and estate administration may be
unavoidably delayed.92 If a decedent had set up an automatic online
bill pay from an online account, the succession representative’s
inability to access that account may cause its eventual overdraft.
Ultimately, “[a]s more people leave behind only electronic records,
it will become increasingly difficult to effectively administer estates.”93
Without a solution, succession representatives will be forced to rely on
the judiciary, which is expensive and time-consuming.
2. Decedent’s Successors
The lack of guidance regarding a decedent’s digital footprint also
affects his successors. One possible problem for successors is one of
timing. If the decedent dies intestate, successors could have to wait a
significant amount of time for the release of his assets, yet they would
still be liable for estate debts.94 The timing problem could also
financially harm a decedent’s business, which could negatively affect
the estate.
90. Passwords are typically random, are 8 to 12 characters long, and are changed
every 90 days. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1046. Online providers discourage the
sharing of passwords. Walker & Blachly, supra note 19, at 182.
91. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1039. The average person has 25 different
passwords. Rex M. Anderson, Digital Assets in Estates, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 2013, at
44; Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 137.
92. Haller, supra note 13.
93. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1041.
94. Id. at 1047.
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Beyond this, successors could be adversely affected by posthumous
identity theft of the decedent or content theft of certain digital items.
Identity theft is a growing problem, certainly for the living and maybe
more so for the deceased.95 Many times, OSPs are simply unaware that
the decedent has passed away.96 Thus, until authorities update
databases regarding a new death, digital items linger in “the Internet
abyss.”97 If a digital item contains sensitive information like credit card
and bank account numbers, it becomes attractive to a potential identity
thief,98 who can open new credit cards, apply for jobs, and get
identification in the name of the deceased.99 Social networking sites are
no exception and have been described by one commentator as “fresh
hunting ground for spammers and hackers,”100 especially if the
decedent stored financial information there.101 The reality is that
“[h]ackers, spammers, and phishers now troll popular social
networking sites like Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace, choosing
carefully among the wealth of identities. The deceased are at
particularly high risk for identity theft; [this is because] they cannot
monitor the activity on their account or report misuse.”102
Deceased bloggers also face a similar problem of content theft and
copyright violations.103 While copyright protection lasts for life plus 70
years,104 without proper protection of that right, the decedent’s
protected works could be stolen, which could destroy the value of the
copyright, an estate asset. The only way to prevent this is to have the
material removed from the deceased’s blog, but as discussed in Part III,
doing so is difficult given most of the TOS in place.
95. Conner, supra note 8, at 321. The Bureau of Justice reported that 11.7 million
Americans were the victims of identity theft between 2006 and 2008, and the
resulting financial losses totaled more than $17 billion. Ray, supra note 3, at 587–88.
More recent sources claim that financial losses caused by identity theft total $56
billion annually. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 232.
96. Conner, supra note 8, at 307.
97. Id. at 307.
98. Id.
99. Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 2. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra
note 5, at 139. Hackers can “change, steal, or remove the . . . digital property of the
decedent.” Ray, supra note 3, at 587.
100. Ray, supra note 3, at 588.
101. Id. at 587–93. For example, if a decedent uses applications like Facebook
Connect, which link his profile to other sites that store financial information, “a
hacker could make purchases using decedent’s account credits, stored credit card
information, or gift cards from sites like Living Social, Groupon, and Amazon.” Id. at
592. This could exhaust the estate assets if the decedent’s credit card is still active and
is equipped with an automatic bill pay function. Id. Similarly, a hacker could take,
spend, or transfer a decedent’s Facebook Credits. Id. at 593.
102. Id. at 585.
103. Id. at 593–95.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
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3. Decedent’s Donees and Their Successors by Gratuitous Title
in Louisiana
In addition to a decedent’s succession representative and
successors, the issue of a decedent’s digital footprint may affect even
more groups of people in this unique, civil law state because of
Louisiana’s recognition of forced heirship. Forced heirship is a civil
law concept codified in Louisiana. It provides that, subject to one
exception,105 if a decedent has forced heirs, he must reserve a certain
portion of his estate, i.e., the forced portion, for them.106 Forced heirs
are children of the decedent who, at the time of the decedent’s death,
are either (a) under the age of 24 or (b) due to a mental incapacity or
physical infirmity, permanently incapable of taking care of their
persons or administering their estates.107 Descendants of more remote
degrees may represent the decedent’s predeceased child for forced
heirship purposes where either (a) the predeceased child of the
decedent, had he lived to the time of decedent’s death, would still be
under the age of 24 or (b) the child of the predeceased child, because of
a mental incapacity or physical infirmity, is permanently incapable of
taking care of his person or administering his estate at the time of the
decedent’s death.108 Subject to one exception,109 if there are two or
more forced heirs, the forced portion is one-half of the decedent’s
estate,110 and each forced heir takes his respective portion called his
“legitime.”111 If there is only one forced heir, the forced portion and
that forced heir’s legitime are one-fourth of the estate.112
In the event that the forced heirs’ legitimes are not satisfied at the
decedent’s death, these heirs may bring an action for reduction,113
which allows them to take back from the hands of the decedent’s
105. The exception to this general rule is disinherison. See generally LA. CIV.
CODE. arts. 1494, 1500, 1617–1626 (2014).
106. Id. art. 1495. The remainder is referred to as the disposable portion. Id.
107. Id. art. 1493(A). See id. art. 1493(E) (defining “permanently incapable of
taking care of their persons or administering their estates at the time of death of the
decedent”).
108. Id. art. 1493(B), (C). The phrase “permanently incapable of taking care of
their persons or administering their estates at the time of death of the decedent” is
defined the same for these forced heirs as it is for first degree descendant forced heirs.
Id. art. 1493(E).
109. See id. art. 1495 (explaining that when the fraction to which a forced heir
would succeed intestate is smaller, that fraction should be used).
110. Id.
111. Id. art. 1494.
112. Id. art. 1495.
113. Id. art. 1503 (explaining that reduction is the remedy). Others besides the
forced heirs may have the right to bring an action for reduction. See id. art. 1504 (also
giving the right to the forced heirs’ heirs or legatees or an assignee of a forced heir or
his heirs or legatees by express conventional assignment).
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donees or their successors by gratuitous title114 the inter vivos and
mortis causa donations115 made by the decedent in the last three years
of life to the extent necessary to satisfy the legitimes.116
To determine whether the forced heirs’ legitimes are satisfied and,
hence, whether they will need to bring an action for reduction, the
value of all property belonging to the decedent at the time of death,
including that purportedly divested by the testament, is added
together.117 From that sum, the estate debts are deducted.118 Then, to
that number, the value of all property disposed of by the decedent in
the three years prior to his death is fictitiously added.119 The resulting
number is called the “active mass,” and it is from the active mass that
the forced heirs’ forced portion (of one-half or one-fourth) is
determined.120
Digital items could affect the decedent’s donees and their
successors by gratuitous title because such items could subject them to
a reduction claim by a forced heir. Take, for example, a fictional
decedent, Mr. X, a widower who dies intestate with one child who
qualifies as a forced heir, $60,000 in corporeal property121 in his estate,
and $10,000 in estate debts. Assume also that he had made a $50,000
cash donation in the past three years to his friend, Ms. A. Thus, his
active mass is $100,000 ($60,000 in estate assets minus $10,000 in
estate debts, plus the $50,000 gift to Ms. A). His forced heir is entitled
to one-fourth of that number, i.e., $25,000. Because Mr. X’s forced
heir is a first degree descendant, he will inherit all of Mr. X’s property
under Louisiana’s intestacy laws.122 Moreover, because Mr. X’s
property at death is corporeal, it will be sufficient to satisfy his forced
heir’s legitime. Therefore, no action for reduction will be required.
114. See id. art. 1910 (defining “gratuitous contract”). Thus, a donee’s successor
by gratuitous title would be one to whom the donee gave the property without
receiving a return advantage.
115. See id. art. 1469 for the definitions of the terms “donation mortis causa” and
“donation inter vivos.”
116. See id. art. 1505(A); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2372 (2005).
Note that some gifts are not subject to reduction. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts.
1505(C), (D), 1510–1511 (2014).
117. Art. 1505(A).
118. Id. art. 1505(B). Although the Civil Code article seems to indicate that this
step should be performed third, as opposed to second, all authorities recognize the
contrary. See, e.g., KATHRYN V. LORIO, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 10:6, in 10
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 320–27 (2d ed. 2009). See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1415
(2014) for a definition of “estate debts.”
119. Art. 1505(A).
120. In re Succession of Linder, 92 So. 3d 1158, 1166 n.5 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
121. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 461 (2014) (“Corporeals are things that have a body,
whether animate or inanimate, and can be felt or touched.”).
122. Id. art. 888.
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However, changing the type of property in the hypothetical could
lead to a different result. Imagine now that Mr. X left behind $10,000
in corporeal property and $50,000 in digital assets about which no one
knows. He also left behind $10,000 in estate debts and had made a
$50,000 cash donation in the past three years to his friend, Ms. A.
Now, because no one is aware of the digital assets worth $50,000, Mr.
X’s active mass is $50,000 ($10,000 in estate assets minus $10,000 in
estate debts, plus the $50,000 gift to Ms. A). His forced heir is entitled
to one-fourth of that number, i.e., $12,500. Because there are
insufficient funds in the estate to cover the forced heir’s legitime, he
will have to assert an action for reduction against Ms. A.
This hypothetical illustrates that in Louisiana, it is not just the
succession representative and successors of the decedent who could be
impacted by a decedent’s digital footprint. In the event that a decedent
left behind forced heirs and also made donations in the three years
prior to his death, his digital footprint could be extremely important to
his donees and their successors by gratuitous title.
B. Privacy Interests
In addition to the estate administration considerations, the digital
footprint issue also calls for a consideration of the privacy rights of
several groups. After all, digital assets may reveal secrets or hurtful
information.123 Consider, for example, the teenager who creates an email account from which he communicates personal details to chosen
individuals or the adulterer who creates an account for the sole purpose
of communicating with an extramarital lover.124 As discovery of this
kind of information may posthumously hurt the decedent’s reputation
and those left behind, that particular digital item, i.e., the e-mail
account, may be better left unfound.
Although in some contexts a person’s privacy rights do not
continue after death,125 most probably expect that at least certain
portions of their digital footprint will remain private. Certainly, the
teenager and adulterer mentioned above have an expectation of privacy
123. As one commentator noted, “Each of us can think of at least one e-mail that
we would not want to fall into the wrong hands.” Justin Atwater, Who Owns E-mail?
Do You Have the Right to Decide the Disposition of Your Private Digital Life?, 2006
UTAH L. REV. 397, 399 (2006). A blogger echoed, “Who would get a hold of those
crazy e-mails or goofball photos, and what could they do with them? . . . Now, just
who do you trust to see ALL of those e-mails (or to filter them before they are seen)?”
Conner, supra note 8.
124. Tarney, supra note 43, at 782. See also Haller, supra note 13 (also raising the
issue of a child born out of wedlock).
125. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1666; Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note
41, at 1654–55; Sherry, supra note 13, at 211.
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when creating their password-protected accounts.126 Some have tried to
negate the privacy interest by pointing out that private letters, diaries,
and photographs can contain information just as private as digital items
and yet are still heritable.127 This may be true for digital items stored
locally, especially those not password-protected. However, this
argument is unpersuasive with regard to at least some digital items. For
instance, as one scholar opined with regard to e-mails, “‘[P]eople
should be able to assume their mail is private, whether they are sending
it via the Postal Service or an electronic method.’”128 Further, people
know when they keep corporeal items, like those mentioned above,
that those things are likely going to be found when they die. The same
cannot necessarily be said of an e-mail account, the existence of which
the decedent may have never disclosed to anyone. Additionally, unlike
traditional letters, many e-mail communications involve a two-way
capture of information. As such, one must consider the privacy rights
of the person with whom the decedent was communicating who may
also want to avoid disclosure of certain information. This could be
especially important if that person has a confidential relationship with
the decedent, such as doctor–patient or attorney–client.
Although e-mail is probably the most notable example, a person
also has a privacy interest in the content on social networking sites,
such as the person’s name and image, educational background,
hometown, contact information, location on certain days at certain
times, and online posts.129 Although a social networking profile is
never entirely “private” because this would defeat the entire point of
social networking, individual users may not want their information
shared outside of the people with whom they have voluntarily
connected. In fact, some users may feel even more protective of their
social networking profiles than they do other digital items because they
are keeping that profile purposefully separate from their real-world
personas. Some people use social networking sites to interact with a
different set of people, show another side of themselves, or say and do
things in the virtual world that they would not say and do in the real
world.130 Likewise, other members of the site may have legitimate
126. Tarney, supra note 43, at 782.
127. Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a Decedent’s Emails:
Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 281, 313 (2007).
128. Atwater, supra note 123, at 405–06 (quoting Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch
Your E-mail! Employee E-mail Monitoring and Privacy Law in the Age of the
“Electronic Sweatshop”, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 144 (1994)).
129. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1652–53.
130. As one blogger explained:
We have ‘Internet friends’ and ‘real life friends.’ We have interests that
we only explore through the Web, and those we never include in any
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privacy interests. These respective privacy interests weigh against
allowing access to a decedent’s digital footprint.
Still, those left behind may have legitimate reasons for wanting to
access the decedent’s digital items, and their interests must be
considered as well. Digital items can hold content that is extremely
valuable, sentimentally speaking, to these people. As a cyberanthropologist Michaelanne Dye noted, “People tend to go back to
these pages on anniversaries, birthdays and holidays’ (sic) as a way to
keep a part of their loved one alive.”131 One commentator noted,
“Some people create new pages as memorial sites, which serves as an
emotional outlet. . . . [C]reating a path so that loved ones can walk your
online trail can help families cope with the loss.”132
Consider, for example, the parents of 21-year-old Benjamin
Stassen, who unexpectedly committed suicide.133 The Stassens are
currently fighting with Facebook and Google for access to Benjamin’s
accounts, averring that information in these accounts may give insight
into Benjamin’s last days and provide them with “some understanding,
maybe some peace.”134 This is but one high-profile example of the

status updates. We can be one person offline, and someone else entirely
on the Web. In many cases, this disconnect is a good thing. . . . [W]hen
our ‘real-life’ selves become trapped by self-doubt or overbearing peers or
family members, an anonymous username can do wonders for our inner
My Little Pony fan.
Andrew Couts, The Digital Self: Our Online Lives are Our ‘Real’ Lives, DIGITAL
TRENDS (May 7, 2013), www.digitaltrends.com/opinion/the-digital-self-our-onlinelives-are-our-real-lives/ [http://perma.cc/G7TJ-2FMB] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
131. Gerry W. Beyer, Your Social Media Page Serves as Emotional Outlet After
You Pass, WILLS, TR. & EST. PROF BLOG (Aug. 23, 2013), http://lawprofessors
typepad.com/trusts_estates_prof/2013/08/courtrooms-across-the-nation-are-decidingthe-fate-of-online-social-media-accounts-for-family-members-who-are-trying-to-ga
in.html [http://perma.cc/AK2W-HY8R] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
132. Id. See also Carrie Arnold, How to Manage Your Digital Afterlife, SCI. AM.
(Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-to-manageyour-digital-afterlife [http://perma.cc/3ZG6-PD2J] (archived Feb. 24, 2014)
(discussing the growing evidence that suggests that one’s digital footprint can help
those left behind grieve and cope); CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 142
(discussing communal bereavement).
133. Jessica Hopper, Digital Afterlife: What Happens to Your Online Accounts
When You Die?, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://rockcenter.nbc
news.com/_news/2012/06/01/11995859-digital-afterlife-what-happens-to-your-onlineaccounts-when-you-die?lite [http://perma.cc/J7PB-ECGY] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
134. Id. Although a local judge issued an order directing Facebook to give the
Stassen family access to their son’s account, to date, the company has not complied.
Id.
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tension between the posthumous privacy rights of the decedent and the
rights of successors.135
Nonetheless, family members should be careful in seeking access
to a decedent’s digital items. As a journalist pointed out in a discussion
of one family’s experience, “[T]aking hold of [the deceased girl’s]
digital afterlife forced her family to tread a line between celebrating
her, and invading her privacy. In the process, her family discovered
some dark journals [she] clearly meant to conceal. She had passwords
for a reason.”136
C. Interests of the OSPs
Caught in the middle of estate administration issues and privacy
battles are the OSPs,137 who “need legal stability and certainty to
design effective services and to craft enforceable contracts.”138 These
companies are financially incentivized to deny access to a decedent’s
digital items, as doing otherwise would cost them time and money.139
Some lack empathy for OSPs, given their substantial revenues and
superior position to aid a decedent’s succession representative.140
Those individuals believe that handling decedents’ digital items should
be part and parcel of an OSP’s business. As one commentator noted,
“Time and money are foreseeable costs in dealing with the realities of
135. See also Tracy Sears, Family Wins in Fight Against Internet Giants, on Hand
When Governor Signs Law, WTVR.COM (Jul. 2, 2013, 1:07 AM), http://wtvr.com/20
13/07/02/eric-rash-family-and-lawmakers-push-for-laws-against-internet-giants-aftersons-suicide/ [http://perma.cc/A4V4-KRVZ] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (discussing the
parents of Eric Rash who, after their son’s suicide at age 15, successfully lobbied for
legislation in Virginia to allow parents and legal guardians the right to posthumously
access a minor’s social media accounts); Anne Hobson, The Digital Afterlife, AM.
SPECTATOR (May 30, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://spectator.org/blog2013/05/30/the-digitalafterlife-what-hap [http://perma.cc/3Y27-7GDX] (archived Mar. 5, 2014) (detailing the
plight of Karen Williams, who figured out her deceased son’s Facebook password only
to see Facebook change it and then take down the account).
136. Haworth, supra note 21, at 2 (quoting Geoffrey A. Fowler, Life and Death
Online: Who Controls a Digital Legacy?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2013, 7:30 AM),
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873246772045781882203
64231346.html) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. “‘It’s a concern of internet service providers being caught between privacy and
the meaning of their contracts and being faced with a court order to which there could
be quite severe penalties if they don’t comply with it.’” Hopper, supra note 133
(quoting Naomi Cahn, law professor at George Washington University). See also Katy
Steinmetz, States Seek a Way to Pass On Digital Accounts After You Die, TIME (Jul. 27,
2013), available at http://swampland.time.com/2013/07/27/states-seek-a-way-to-passon-digital-accounts-after-you-die/ [http://perma.cc/C6Y8-CSXK] (archived Feb. 24,
2014) (noting that companies are “in a sticky position” for the same reason).
138. Tarney, supra note 43, at 793.
139. Ray, supra note 3, at 613; Tarney, supra note 43, at 799.
140. Ray, supra note 3, at 613.
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businesses founded on services to individuals, and these costs cannot
justifiably be passed on to society for the sole purpose of increasing
profit margins.”141
However, most OSPs are justifiably nervous about violating privacy
laws,142 and their businesses may be negatively affected if they earn the
reputation of disseminating private information.143 Worse, the OSPs
could be liable if they provide access to or copies of a decedent’s digital
items to an individual lacking the legal right to get them.144 Further
restraining the OSPs are their own TOS145 that recognize that a user may
want to maintain his privacy even posthumously.146 Understandably,
OSPs lean towards honoring their own TOS and, in most instances, will
fight to enforce them, invoking their users’ privacy rights.147
Consider one of the most publicized such stories—that of Justin
Ellsworth, a U.S. Marine killed in the line of duty in Iraq in 2004.148
During his tour, Ellsworth communicated with others by e-mail and
planned to create a scrapbook of all of those communications when he
returned home.149 Upon his death, Justin’s family decided to honor his
memory by assembling the scrapbook that he had planned.150
However, Yahoo! refused to allow them access to his account, citing
its TOS.151 Eventually, a probate court in Oakland County, Michigan,
ordered Yahoo! to provide copies of the e-mails.152 Yahoo! has
proclaimed that in the future, it will continue to adhere to its TOS even
in the face of requests similar to those of the Ellsworth family.
Some support the OSPs’ position. As Rebecca Jeschke of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, a digital civil liberties group,
explained, “I think it’s a good idea for sites not to have a blanket policy
to hand this stuff over to survivors. This information is private and you
assume that it’s private, you assume that your Facebook account is
private, you assume that your email account is private . . . .”153 Others
disagree, arguing that it is in the best interest of the OSPs to allow
access after death, as this will encourage increased use of their services
and greater creativity in that use.154 Ultimately, OSPs seem to be in a
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
See infra Part III.
Tarney, supra note 43, at 794.
See Ray, supra note 3.
See infra Part III.
Hopper, supra note 133.
Maimes, supra note 14.
CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 12–14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hopper, supra note 133.
Kutler, supra note 10.
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catch-22 situation. They are vilified as insensitive if they refuse access
to grieving families, yet they are vilified as inconsistent if they grant
it.155
D. Societal Interests
Rounding out the list of those interested in the digital footprint
issue is society. Many people save various things in digital format, and
if they fail to alert others of and provide access to those things, certain
memories and stories of their lives could be lost forever. This is a loss
not only for a decedent’s legacy and successors but also for society as a
whole. Digital items can be “informative snapshots of current society
for the benefit of future generations and as a means of encouraging
societal creativity.”156 This is especially true of social networking
accounts, which may be the principal—and eventually only—source
for future generations to learn about their predecessors.157 Thus, it is
predicted that future historians will depend upon digital archives to
reconstruct the past, and if digital items are inaccessible, historians lose
valuable pieces of history.158 As one person noted: “Without some type
of digital asset reform now, we will remain indebted to archeologists in
the future to tell future generations about the electronic world we live
in today. Why not make their job easier?”159 Therefore, this interest
weighs in favor of allowing access to a decedent’s digital footprint.
III. LEGAL ISSUES
In addition to potentially affecting the interests of several groups of
people, a decedent’s digital footprint triggers legal issues in a variety of
areas of substantive law. All hinge on whether some or all of the digital
items in a decedent’s digital footprint can be transferred or accessed
upon death. The first issue is whether digital items are properly
considered property. After all, if they are not, they are not owned by
the decedent and are not transferred with the rest of his patrimony at
155. Tarney, supra note 43.
156. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1654.
157. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1659. This concept is
reinforced by the fact that the Library of Congress now archives all public tweets
because “[i]ndividually tweets might seem insignificant, but viewed in the aggregate,
they can be a resource for future generations to understand life in the 21st century.”
Id. at 1660.
158. Id. at 1644.
159. Comments to the draft Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act from Richard
and Diane Rash, July 5, 2013, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs
/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013jul5_FADA_Comments_
Rash.pdf [http://perma.cc/M55Y-W9LX] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
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death. The second issue is whether, in light of the OSPs’ TOS, the
relevant contract law will prohibit transfer or access. Some TOS, for
example, preclude the transfer of certain digital items and also bar the
sharing of passwords. The final issue is whether certain privacy
statutes, written long before the digital era, will unintentionally do the
same.
A. Property/Estate Law
For many people, transferring their patrimony at death is necessary
to preserve their assets and provide financially and emotionally for
future generations. 160 Thus, doing so has historically been a
fundamental property right.161 Over the years, the definition of
property has evolved to include more intangible, or incorporeal,162
assets.163 However, “[m]ost of the estates and property laws go back
hundreds of years, long before digital life, and yet those old legal
concepts are now trying to deal with the digital today.”164 And, of
course, traditional property concepts do not always perfectly align with
digital items, leading to some confusion and disagreement as to
whether digital items are even properly considered property.165 If the
digital item is in fact property, then theoretically, the user owns it and
can transfer it either during life or at death because “[o]wnership and
transferability of assets are linked together.”166 However, if the digital
item is not property, it may not be susceptible of either ownership or
transfer by the decedent. In the latter scenario, it could not be
transferred via succession law, even if done so pursuant to a legally
valid testament.
Although it may be argued that digital items lacking financial value
are not property, this argument lacks merit. The monetary value of an
item is not determinative of its status as property.167 After all, old photo
160. CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 58–59.
161. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 210.
162. Incorporeal property in a civil law system is, for the most part, equivalent to
the common law’s intangible property. See, e.g., La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v.
McNamara, 561 So. 2d 712, 717 (La. 1990).
163. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1664.
164. Cantrill et al., supra note 8.
165. See, e.g., Tarney, supra note 43, at 783 (“There is substantial ambiguity in
defining the ownership status of digital assets.”); Shah, supra note 34 (“[T]here is no
real consensus regarding ownership and transferability of digital assets . . . .” );
CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 121 (stating that “the law isn’t even sure that
email can be considered property”).
166. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 224.
167. According to renowned civil law scholar, A. N. Yiannopolous, “In Louisiana
jurisprudence, the word property is used broadly to denote rights forming part of a
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albums and recipe books may lack monetary value, but no one
questions whether they are part of a decedent’s patrimony. Others may
argue that digital items should not be considered “property” because
they are not actually owned by the decedent.168 Given the current lack
of direction on the digital footprint issue in Louisiana and the OSPs’
TOS (discussed in further detail below), this position is a valid one
with respect to at least some digital assets. After all, some TOS provide
that, upon uploading information to the site, the user transfers
ownership of that information to the OSP.169 In those situations,
decedents do not own the digital items (either during life or at death).
Other TOS provide that digital items are nothing more than licenses
allowing one to use an OSP’s services,170 and typically, these licenses
are non-transferrable and expire upon the death of the licensee–user.171
Thus, in those situations, the digital items are not property susceptible
of ownership.172 Therefore, even if a decedent leaves behind
usernames and passwords in a legally valid will (which may also be
prohibited by the TOS),173 the decedent does not actually legally
transfer anything. After all, a will cannot transfer something that no
longer exists.
On the other hand, other digital items, such as those that constitute
intellectual property, are properly classified as incorporeal property.174
For example, copyright law protects original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression.175 As such, certain materials

person’s patrimony . . . .” A. N. YIANNOPOLOUS, PROPERTY § 3, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 4 (4th ed. 2001).
168. Tarney, supra note 43, at 783 (“Commentators have recognized that
traditional property concepts have created a substantial ambiguity in defining the
ownership status of digital assets.”). See also Shah, supra note 34 (“[T]here is no real
consensus regarding ownership and transferability of digital assets . . . .” ); Beyer &
Griffin, supra note 43.
169. Conner, supra note 8, at 305.
170. Shah, supra note 34; Baldino, supra note 8, at 29; Walker & Blachly, supra
note 19.
171. Walker & Blachly, supra note 19.
172. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1648 (discussing
Facebook); Haworth, supra note 21, at 21 (discussing iTunes).
173. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1648.
174. Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 n.5 (Cal. 1991)
(“Intellectual property is the most intangible form of property . . . .”). See also
Elizabeth H. Sillin, Five Estate Planning Tips for Managing Your Digital Assets,
http://www.bulkley.com/bulletins/winter-2012/five-estate-planning-tips-for-mana
ging-your-digital-assets/ [http://perma.cc/NM2J-TAZD] (archived Feb. 24, 2014)
(noting that things that have been published online should be protected by copyright
laws and, under those laws, transferable).
175. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
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that a decedent authors, like poems, essays, photographs, videos,
commentary, and status updates, satisfy the definition of “original
works of authorship,” and their storage in digital form renders them
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Therefore, such items should
qualify as intellectual property and be protected by federal copyright
law by the plain language of the statute.176 And because a copyright is
properly classified as property, it can (at least theoretically)177 be
transferred at death through state successions law.178
B. Contract Law
Contract law is another area of law that may impact the digital
footprint issue. In many cases, the contract that a decedent entered into
when creating certain digital items, i.e., the TOS, precludes access to
that digital item.179 Some do so by defining a period of inactivity
beyond which the account is deactivated or deleted.180 Others disallow
the sharing of passwords and specifically forbid the transfer of the
account.181 This means that, in many cases, the TOS forbid the
decedent’s succession representative from accessing or managing the
decedent’s digital items.182
Although users are at least theoretically aware of and encouraged
to read the TOS, many do not do so carefully, if at all.183 Studies show
that the number of users who “even skim” the TOS “may be about two
in every one thousand,”184 and only 4% of all online customers actually
176. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1649 (discussing
Facebook).
177. Although the successors may, via state successions law, own the copyrightprotected material in question, they may not be able to access it or obtain a copy of
the materials from the website provider in question. Tarney, supra note 43, at 783.
Also, per the TOS, the OSP may legally destroy the copy, which might be the only
copy. Id. at 784–85.
178. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1649. See also Elizabeth H.
Sillin, Five Estate Planning Tips for Managing Your Digital Assets, BULKLEY
RICHARDSON, http://www.bulkley.com/bulletins/winter-2012/five-estate-planningtips-for-managing-your-digital-assets (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [http://perma
.cc/DF6X-H38F] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (noting that things that you have published
online should be protected by copyright laws, and under those laws, transferable).
179. Of course, this is not true of all digital items. Some provide that the account
may be transferred by operation of a will. Wu, supra note 10, at 4. Some set forth
procedures that a decedent’s succession representative must follow to get access to
the deceased user’s account. Baldino, supra note 8, at 30.
180. CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7.
181. Laise, supra note 27.
182. Id.; Haller, supra note 13; Hopper, supra note 133.
183. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 141; Maimes, supra note
14; Kutler, supra note 10, at 1645–46.
184. Sherry, supra note 13, at 205.
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read beyond the “price and product description.”185 Even those who do
read the TOS may not understand them and are typically in no position
to bargain for any alternative terms.186 Thus, more often than not, the
TOS unilaterally dictate the fate of the account, leading some to
criticize the companies as “[t]rying to be God-like.”187 As one industry
commentator explained:
You know, those boxes that pop up with thousands of words of
tiny text that you never read followed by a box that you are
required to check that says “I Agree”. Yeah, those. Somewhere
buried in there is language that likely allows the service provider
to pretty much dictate whatever they want . . . .188
Thus, some argue that the TOS are contracts of adhesion and should
not be enforced.189 Yet, most courts disagree, leaving the OSPs with no
incentive to change them.190
All of this poses a significant problem because in most cases,
although the content of an account clearly belongs to the decedent, the
OSP’s denial of access leaves the succession representative in a
difficult position. Even if the succession representative has the log-in
information and authority of the decedent, accessing the digital item
may constitute a violation of the TOS, which could leave the estate
vulnerable to liability.191
185. Tarney, supra note 43, at 778–79.
186. Michael D. Roy, Note, Beyond the Digital Asset Dilemma: Will Online
Services Revolutionize Estate Planning, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 376, 381 (2011).
187. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1651. See also Tarney, supra note 43, at 793
(referring to the OSPs as having the upper hand).
188. Jeffrey R. Gottlieb, Introduction to Estate Planning for Digital Assets, L.
OFF. ROBERT GLORCH (June 25, 2013), http://www.illinoisestateplan.com/intro
duction-to-estate-planning-for-digital-assets [http://perma.cc/HT4C-BU4E] (archived
Feb. 24, 2014).
189. Tarney, supra note 43, at 778; Sherry, supra note 13, at 204. In Louisiana,
“[a]dhesion contracts are not automatically void. Instead, the party seeking to avoid
the contract generally must show that it is unconscionable.” Lafleur v. Law Offices of
Anthony G. Buzbee, 960 So. 2d 105, 112 (La. Ct. App. 2007) “Unconscionability
refers to an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together
with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” Id. Thus, to be
unenforceable under this theory, a contract must contain both a procedural and
substantive element of unconscionability but not necessarily in the same degree. Id.
190. Cahn, supra note 29, at 37; Kutler, supra note 10, at 1646. In rare cases, a
court will rule the TOS unenforceable. Sherry, supra note 13, at 205. For example, in
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Penn. 2007), the court
found parts of Second Life’s TOS unconscionable, as they assumed too much power
and were unreasonably biased against the user. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1658.
191. The danger is that “a court would . . . hold the decedent’s estate bound to the
terms of the user agreement, in the same way it would hold the decedent while he was
alive.” Conner, supra note 8, 313.
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Of course, court orders can trump TOS.192 After all, if an OSP is
doing business in a jurisdiction and the court orders it to do something,
it has to comply; if not, it can be held in contempt of court.193
However, securing such an order is not necessarily an easy task. As
one author explained, “You’ve got to hire lawyers. It’s timeconsuming. Some people may go to all that trouble and it took forever
to get the order and by the time they got it, the stuff had been
destroyed. It’s just an unworkable and very inefficient way of doing
things.”194 Similarly, another commentator labeled the “tension
between restrictive contractual agreements and digital development” as
“a perfect storm.”195
C. Privacy Statutes
Even if the items in a decedent’s digital footprint are considered
property and even if the TOS do not prohibit sharing passwords or
transferring the digital items, there is still another problem: Certain
criminal and civil privacy statutes may disallow or impede access to
the decedent’s digital footprint.
For example, as one commentator noted, “If you use your late
mother’s password to log on to her account, you may violate not only
the provider’s terms of service but also the federal Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act.”196 This statute, referred to by its acronym CFAA,
criminalizes the intentional unauthorized access of certain computers.197
Given that it was enacted in the 1980s before the average American used
computers or the Internet, Congress probably never intended the CFAA
to apply to the digital footprint issue.198 Nevertheless, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) has proclaimed that violating the TOS on
certain websites is a federal crime under the CFAA; that said, the DOJ
has also stated that it has no intent to prosecute what it deems “minor
violations.”199 Although research reveals no case of prosecution of a
succession representative for unauthorized access to a decedent’s digital
footprint under this statute, there is no guarantee that prosecution under
these circumstances would never happen.200
192. Hopper, supra note 133.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Tarney, supra note 43, at 782.
196. Laise, supra note 27.
197. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
198. Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, UNIV. CINCINNATI, http://www.uc.edu/info
sec/compliance/cfaa.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) [http://perma.cc/3GJU-K89Y]
(archived Feb. 24, 2014).
199. Haller, supra note 13.
200. Id.
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Additionally, the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Access Act (SCA) prohibits certain conduct by
individuals and the OSP. Section 2701 applies to individuals and
prohibits them from (1) “intentionally access[ing] without
authorization a facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided” and (2) “intentionally exceed[ing] an authorization
to access that facility.”201 It does not apply to “conduct authorized . . .
by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or
intended for that user.”202 The term “authorization” is not defined in
the SCA, and a violation of this section can lead to imprisonment and
fines.203 Section 2702 governs OSPs and bars them from knowingly
divulging the contents of a communication unless disclosure is made
“to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication” or
“with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended
recipient.”204 Of course, consent is impossible to obtain from the
decedent after death; instead, it would have to have been given before
death, either via a will or some other juridical act or by conduct in
forwarding account information.205 Consent is also difficult to obtain
from the other party if it is a financial institution, given the statutes and
jurisprudence restricting the institution’s ability to disclose
information.206 Further, if the OSP’s TOS specifically prohibit the user
from granting access to others, doing so could be a violation of these
statutes as being without consent.207 Developing case law indicates a
willingness on the part of some courts to consider at least some
communications through some popular digital items to be subject to
the SCA.208 Violations can subject OSPs to statutory damages
(including, in some cases, punitive damages), attorneys’ fees, and
costs.209

201. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006).
202. Id. § 2701.
203. Id. § 2701(b).
204. Id. § 2702.
205. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1053.
206. Id. at 1054 (discussing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§
6801–6809, and the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–
3422).
207. Beyer, supra note 10, at 6.
208. See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (ruling that private messages sent through a web-based e-mail provider or
through social networking are subject to the SCA); People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d
505, 511 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) (ruling Twitter to be an electronic communication
provider under the SCA).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (2006).
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IV. CURRENT APPROACH
There is no targeted approach to the digital footprint issue in
Louisiana because neither the Legislature nor the courts has
specifically addressed the issue. Thus, the onus is on the individual to
provide for his digital footprint via estate planning.210 However, some
claim that “[t]he tools and resources that estate planners and their
clients have relied on for hundreds of years have become obsolete
because of technology.”211 There are two versions of an estate plan that
one can take in planning for his digital footprint: (1) the inventory
model or (2) the trust model. As discussed in detail in this Part, neither
is ideal.
A. Inventory Model
The first estate planning tool that a decedent could use is an
inventory. The inventory model has been touted as an easy-to-use,
inexpensive, portable, easily accessible, and time-saving way to
preserve assets.212 The inventory model hinges on the decedent’s
creation of a central inventory of his digital footprint, the location of
which he then informs someone else. Proponents of this model advise
those using it to update all of the information in the inventory
regularly.213
However, beyond these basics, there is a lack of consensus on best
practices for this model. Some suggest that people should explain their
wishes regarding each digital asset (preferably in writing).214 Some
suggest treating different digital assets differently.215 Other differences
of opinion arise with regard to where to include the inventory, how to
provide for access to one’s digital footprint, and where to store the
inventory. As for where to include the inventory, some suggest
210. In rare instances, a digital item may fall within Louisiana’s abandoned
property statute, the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1997. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:151-170 (2008).
211. Goldman & Jamison, supra note 5, at 2. See also Hopkins, supra note 4, at
229 (stating that “traditional estate planning is not well equipped for the task” of
dealing “with the unique challenges of digital assets”).
212. Haller, supra note 13; Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1042; Baldino, supra note
8, at 30. Phrased in the converse, in the absence of an inventory, digital assets could
be lost forever. The well-known example is Leonard Bernstein, who died in 1990
with an electronic manuscript for his memoir, Blue Ink, in a password-protected file.
Beyer, supra note 10, at 4; Beyer & Cahn, When You Pass On, supra note 13, at 41.
To date, the password has not been located, and the file remains inaccessible. Id.
213. Baldino, supra note 8, at 30.
214. Walker & Blachly, supra note 19, at 182; Cahn, supra note 29, at 38–39.
215. Cahn, supra note 29, at 38–39.
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incorporating the inventory into a will.216 Others suggest merely
referencing the inventory in the will.217 Some suggest separate
documents for the inventory, on the one hand, and the access
instructions (like the website domain name, usernames, passwords, and
answers to security questions), on the other.218 Further, others
recommend separate documents for usernames and passwords.219 As
for authorizing access to digital assets, many urge people to grant their
succession representatives access to their digital footprints in their
wills.220 Others suggest appointing a digital executor, i.e., someone to
act objectively on behalf of a decedent and ensure the proper transfer
of his digital assets according to his wishes,221 and some suggest
granting the digital executor a power of attorney over the accounts.222
Still others recommend that the decedent authorize his OSPs to
disclose log-in information to the succession representative.223 Some
suggest storing the inventory, access information, and instructions in
different locations, such as on hard copy, locally, or online. Others
recommend storing them with a trusted person (possibly one’s digital
executor or attorney), in a safety deposit box, or with a digital afterlife
company.224

216. Estate Planning in a Digital Era, CTA, http://ctainvest.org/home/insuranceestate-planning/estate-plan/Estate-Planning-in-a-Digital-Era.aspx (last visited Oct. 23,
2013) [http://perma.cc/ET9P-AUMY] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
217. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 150; Beyer & Cahn, When
You Pass On, supra note 13, at 42.
218. Baldino, supra note 8, at 30.
219. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 151; Beyer & Cahn, When
You Pass On, supra note 13, at 43.
220. Baldino, supra note 8, at 31.
221. CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 100. Note, though, that the law does
not currently recognize a digital executor. Id.
222. Hill, supra note 16.
223. Laise, supra note 27. According to this source, doing so will allow the
succession representative to have copies of the contents of the digital items, rather
than access to the account itself, which could violate certain statutes and the TOS. Id.
224. Hill, supra note 16; Walker & Blachly, supra note 19, at 182–83. Digital
afterlife companies are growing in number and popularity. See generally B. Bonin
Bough, Digital Death and Digital Afterlife: Serious Business, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2011,
6:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/boninbough/2011/04/11/digital-death-anddigital-afterlife-serious-business/ [http://perma.cc/QE5B-RTLR] (archived Mar. 6,
2014). Some of the best known are SecureSafe, AssetLock, and Legacy Locker.
Sarah Kellog, Managing Your Digital Afterlife: Cyber Footprint, Ownership, and
Access, DC BAR (Jan. 2013), http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications
/washington-lawyer/articles/January-2013-digital-afterlife.cfm [http://perma.cc/7TFN
-UGBL] (archived Mar. 6, 2014). Though differences exist among them, there are
common features. Each acts as an online safe deposit box by storing passwords and
other digital items to be passed along to a beneficiary upon the owner’s death.
Hobson, supra note 135.
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Despite its advantages, the inventory approach is theoretically and
practically limited. Theoretically, the inventory model relies on an
individual to plan for his digital footprint in advance, so it does not
address the estate of the decedent who dies leaving behind no
instructions. Most people do not keep track of their own digital
footprints while alive, “let alone keep records sufficient to direct
someone else to posthumously discern the situation.”225 Even if a
person does grant access to his digital footprint through an inventory
with usernames and passwords or through a digital afterlife company,
this is not the same as giving the digital assets themselves. As
discussed in Part III above, many digital assets are nontransferable
licenses that expire at death. As a result, a decedent following the
inventory model is simply granting to someone access to something
that technically no longer exists upon his death. Further, the decedent
is, from the grave, potentially violating the TOS and subjecting
someone else to potential criminal and civil liability under federal
privacy statutes by following the inventory model.
The inventory model is also flawed from a practical perspective. It
is burdensome in that the decedent must remember to update the
inventory every time he creates a new digital item or changes a
password. It also requires a tech-savvy succession representative,226
and if the decedent includes the inventory in his will, that information
could become public.227 Including it in a will could also get expensive
if an estate planning attorney is used, given the regular updates needed
to keep an inventory current.228 On the other hand, if an estate attorney
is not used, the individual will need a working knowledge of state
successions law, as this will dictate how he must update the will and, in
turn, the inventory listed therein.229 Additionally, the security of the
inventory is worrisome. Even if it is not included in a public document
like a will, the inventory could be lost if the device on which the file is
stored is lost or broken.230 Potentially more dangerous is the fact that
the inventory model entails sharing passwords during life, a practice
that risks premature access to one’s digital footprint,231 rendering this

225. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1043.
226. Anne Eisenberg, Bequeathing The Keys to Your Digital Afterlife, N.Y. TIMES
(May 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/technology/estate-planning-isimportant-for-your-online-assets-too.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/8G5F-UJ6B] (archived
Feb. 24, 2014); Walker & Blachly, supra note 19, at 183.
227. Maimes, supra note 14; Conner, supra note 8, at 320.
228. Conner, supra note 8, at 320–21; Joseph M. Mentrek, Estate Planning in a
Digital World, 10 OHIO PROB. L. J. 195 (2009).
229. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 150.
230. Haller, supra note 13.
231. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1059.
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model counterintuitive to security best practices.232 Those using an
online password storage service do not wholly ameliorate this issue, as
this leads to one password becoming extremely powerful.233 Storing
with an attorney is also uncertain because some attorneys are hesitant
to agree to this. As one attorney stated, “I don’t want to be responsible
for storing people’s passwords and access codes . . . . If their account
gets hacked I have no way of proving it wasn’t somebody on my staff
who had access to that information.”234
Those using digital afterlife companies face a whole host of
additional business, practical, and legal issues. First, the business
model is questionable. While customers entrust digital afterlife
companies with usernames and passwords, some criticize the industry
as disreputable.235 Others question the longevity of such companies,236
given that their very existence “is dependent upon the whims and
attention spans of their creators and creditors.”237 Additionally,
although some extol the security systems of such companies,238 others
worry about breaches.239 Finally, some of these companies charge fees,
excluding them as an option for some potential customers.
Practically speaking, digital afterlife companies leave much to be
desired. For example, one left behind must know that the decedent had
an account in the first place; lack of this knowledge would wholly
defeat the purpose of having an account.240 Also, as with a hard-copy
inventory, the customer must continually update the information stored
with the digital afterlife company.241 And some of these companies
232. Beyer & Cahn, When You Pass On, supra note 13, at 43 (“Repeatedly, we
are told neither to keep written records of our passwords nor to share them with
anyone.”); Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 6.
233. Beyer, supra note 10, at 8.
234. Marshall, supra note 1 (quoting estate planning attorney Wendy Goffe).
235. The companies have been accused of offering “snake oil gimmicks” to
customers and have been dubbed “a big fat lawsuit waiting to happen.” Walker &
Blachly, supra note 19, at 185, 186 (quoting David Shulan, an estate planning
attorney in Florida). One attorney proclaimed he “would relish the opportunity to
represent the surviving spouse of a decedent whose eBay business was ‘given away’
by Legacy Locker to an online friend in Timbuktu.” Id.; Perrone, supra note 5, at 203.
236. Rex M. Anderson, Digital Assets in Estates, ARIZ. ATT’Y, March 2013, at 45;
Haller, supra note 13.
237. Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 6; Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra
note 5, at 152. This concern is valid, as over a two year time frame, about one-third of
the companies went out of business or merged. Beyer, supra note 10, at 10.
238. Haller, supra note 13.
239. Beyer & Cahn, When You Pass On, supra note 13, at 43; Beyer & Griffin,
supra note 43, at 6; Eisenberg, supra note 226.
240. Haller, supra note 13. Some companies give customers a card for their wallet
or files directing medical personnel or family members to report the death to the
company. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1060.
241. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1060.
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send out information to beneficiaries if the customer fails to respond to
an “are you alive” notice, even when it could be that the customer
simply mistakenly failed to respond.242
The digital afterlife business model also triggers legal issues.
Though the creators of digital afterlife companies are diverse in terms
of education and sophistication, they are typically not estate planners,
which leads some to criticize the companies for misleading customers
about the extent and legality of the services offered.243 For example,
although a person may believe that his account with one of these
companies will validly transfer his digital footprint at his death, this is
not true;244 simply providing the information to access a digital
footprint is not synonymous with actually transferring ownership of the
digital items in it upon death.245 Registering for a digital afterlife
account cannot transfer digital items; that can be done only by a valid
will that satisfies certain form requirements.246 Furthermore, it is
doubtful whether these companies can even validly provide access to
digital items, as the very essence of their services violates many
TOS247 and possibly the statutes discussed in Part III, as well.248
B. Trust Model
Another estate planning tool that a decedent could use is the
creation of a trust. A trust “is the relationship resulting from the
transfer of title to property to a person to be administered by him as a
fiduciary for the benefit of another.”249 The trust model is based on the
notion that a trust and any assets validly in it survive the decedent.250
One way to utilize this model is for the trust to be the registered user of
digital items. However, that option would not work for digital items
already registered to an individual user. Another option, at least with
regard to transferrable digital items, is for the registered user to transfer
242. Walker & Blachly, supra note 19, at 186; Perrone, supra note 5, at 203.
243. Roy, supra note 186, at 387–88. See also Hopkins, supra note 4, at 235
(stating that “very few of the [digital afterlife] services provide legal estate planning
solutions”).
244. Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 7; Roy, supra note 186, at 378.
245. Conner, supra note 8, at 318; Perrone, supra note 5, at 202.
246. See Walker & Blachly, supra note 19, at 181; Cahn, supra note 29, at 39.
Some digital afterlife companies provide for a separate memorandum to be included
in the will, but these are without legal effect in many states, absent certain formalities.
Conner, supra note 8, at 318–19.
247. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1655; Cahn, supra note 29, at 38.
248. Laise, supra note 27.
249. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1731 (2005).
250. Conner, supra note 8, at 319; Beyer & Cahn, When You Pass On, supra note
13, at 42.
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the digital items into the trust during his life or, for those transferrable
digital assets that do not expire at death, upon his death.
The trust model resolves a major problem of the inventory model
in that it actually transfers the digital item in question from the
decedent to his beneficiaries. However, it is not immune from
theoretical and practical complications. Theoretically, the trust model
may fail, at least with regard to OSPs that limit ownership and use to
individuals.251 Even when ownership by an entity is allowed, a trustee
owner is a somewhat novel solution, which may cause delays in
processing the decedent’s succession while the OSP reviews unfamiliar
legal documents and interprets how to apply the various privacy
laws.252 And just like the inventory model, it fails to address intestate
successions, relies on advance planning, and requires continual
updating, all of which are valid concerns.
The trust model also shares the inventory model’s practical hitch of
requiring that the decedent have a tech-savvy succession
representative. Further, if the trust in question is an inter vivos trust, it
triggers the same dangers of sharing log-in information as the
inventory model. The trust model also does not resolve the issue of
transferring those digital items that are nontransferable (during life or
upon death) per the TOS, nor does it preclude liability under the
privacy statutes mentioned in Part III. Finally, the trust model has been
described as “overkill” for those with a small digital footprint.253
V. POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS
Because estate planning is currently the only option in Louisiana, a
better resolution to the digital footprint issue is needed. Others have
offered several potential options, including company policy changes,
an ad hoc judicial approach, a federal statute, state statutes, or a
uniform statute. This Section presents an overview of each.
A. Company Policy Changes
The easiest solution to the digital footprint issue is for OSPs to
revise their terms, preferably in a uniform way. Lawyers and leaders of
the bar are hopeful that discussion among stakeholders will lead, at a
minimum, to a set of “industry guidelines” and “best practices.”254
Some commentators have suggested that those best practices should
allow users the power to designate what will happen to their accounts
251.
252.
253.
254.

Haller, supra note 13.
Id.
Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 5.
Cohen, supra note 11.
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upon death.255 This decision would function in a similar fashion to the
choices that users make regarding their privacy settings on certain
online accounts.256 If all of the OSPs did this, then more individuals
would at least consider the issue.257 The problem, of course, is that
there is no mechanism to mandate this, leaving businesses free to selfregulate and consumer advocacy as the sole means of persuasion.258
Some OSPs have indicated a willingness to respond to such
persuasion259 and have changed their TOS on their own initiative. The
most notable of these are the recent changes to Google’s policy.
Google’s Inactive Account Manager, nicknamed “Google
Death,”260 allows Google users to pre-designate what will happen to
their accounts after a certain period of inactivity, ranging from 3 to 12
months.261 Upon the inactivity period’s expiration and after attempting
to reach the user via text and secondary e-mail, Google will respect the
user’s designation to either terminate the account or send the data to
designated persons.262
One commentator, Gerry Beyer, applauded Google and urged other
OSPs to follow its lead.263 He suggested that OSPs provide an “easy
255. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 154; Mazzone, Facebook’s
Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1677–78.
256. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1677–78.
257. See CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 173.
258. Mazzone, The Right to Die Online, supra note 55, at 1. Some believe that
existing company policies do not protect users. Id. (discussing Facebook).
259. Sherry, supra note 13, at 229. For example, after Instagram (a company
owned by Facebook) tried to change its TOS to give advertisers free access to photos
stored on their site, users complained such that the company acquiesced and revised
the TOS again. Haworth, supra note 21, at 23. In September 2013, Facebook
announced its plans to change its TOS to nearly mirror those in the failed Instagram
TOS. Nancy Kim, Happy Groundhog Day, Facebook!, CONTRACTSPROFBLOG (Sept.
13, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2013/09/happygroundhogs-day-face book.html [http://perma.cc/4429-3AV3] (archived Feb. 24,
2014). This announcement garnered protests from users and privacy advocacy
groups, and six privacy groups wrote to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
complain. Id. The FTC has announced that it will investigate whether Facebook’s
proposed TOS violate an agreement that the company reached with the FTC in 2011.
Id. Only time will tell whether Facebook will voluntarily retreat from its proposed
TOS.
260. Will Oremus, Have You Written Your Google Will?, SLATE (Apr. 11, 2013,
6:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/04/11/google_death_in
active_account_manager_lets_you_plan_digital_afterlife.html [http://perma.cc/3WRXDH6U] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
261. Andreas Tuerk, Plan Your Digital Afterlife with Inactive Account Manager,
GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Apr. 11, 2013), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot
.com/2013/04/plan-your-digital-afterlife-with.html [http://perma.cc/TDW8-HKU5]
(archived Feb. 24, 2014).
262. Id.
263. Beyer, supra note 10, at 19.
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method at the time a person signs up for a new service so the person
can designate the disposition of the account upon the owner’s . . .
death.”264 Although this is a preferred solution, “market pressure may
be insufficient to discipline businesses,” and some smaller OSPs may
not have the resources to emulate Google’s approach.265 Further, even
for those OSPs enacting such policies, the scope may be somewhat
limited because there is no requirement that existing users take
advantage of the new service.
B. Ad Hoc Decisions
Another option is to simply leave this issue for the courts to decide
on an ad hoc basis. However, this solution is unattractive for two
reasons. First, such an approach runs counter to one of the basic tenets
of Louisiana’s civil law system, according to which all sources of law
are not created equally. The civil law system distinguishes between
primary and secondary sources of law, and judicial opinions are merely
a secondary source,266 meaning they are not binding and merely serve
as persuasive authority.267 As a result, the ad hoc approach could lead
to inconsistent decisions among different courts and a resulting lack of
certainty for Louisiana citizens. This, in turn, could make it difficult for
attorneys to advise their clients.
Second, ad hoc decisions would be a strain on the judiciary. As
already mentioned, the number of digital items has grown significantly
over the years and is expected to continue to do so in the future.268
Further, more and more Internet users with digital footprints are going
to continue to die. Thus, this issue is only going to become more
prevalent and problematic as time passes. Leaving the issue for judicial
resolution on an ad hoc basis would be burdensome for the court
system.
C. Federal Statute
Some have suggested that a federal statute would remedy the
digital footprint issue. The Commerce Clause should allow Congress
the authority to legislate on this topic,269 and this is definitely an
attractive solution because it would ensure uniformity and foster

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Tarney, supra note 43, at 779. See also Kutler, supra note 10, at 1656.
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1–3 (2014); id. art. 1, cmt. b.
Id. art. 1, cmt. b.
See supra note 9.
Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1681.
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certainty.270 Given the global nature of the digital footprint issue, a
federal statute could be a “better and clearer source of ownership
rights.”271
However, at this time, there is “little movement” in Congress on
this issue; actually, one Congressman has called for a moratorium on
legislation addressing one’s digital footprint.272 Additionally, there is a
lack of consensus on the appropriate substance of such a statute and
concern that a federal statute may be politically motivated and, as a
result, impractical and adopted without close attention to detail.273
Ultimately, commentators express a lack of faith in Congress’s ability
to craft a substantively appropriate statute.274
Further, it is possible that a federal statute could trigger federalism
problems under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.275
After all, property and successions are areas of law traditionally
reserved to the states.276 Depending on the substance of a federal
statute on a decedent’s digital footprint, it is possible that such a statute
could impinge on the states’ rights.
D. State Statutes
A converse approach could be to allow Louisiana to resolve the
digital footprint issue in its own way. There has been a recent
movement toward this in other states,277 and a small number of state
270. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying
the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 615–16,
618 (1989).
271. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 241.
272. Beyer, supra note 10, at 19–20.
273. Ray, supra note 3, at 602.
274. See Sherry, supra note 13, at 244; see also Darrow & Ferrera, supra note
127, at 318.
275. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people.”).
276. See, e.g., Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 517 (1938)
(“[T]he regulation of rights in property is a matter reserved to the States . . . .”).
277. In recent years, numerous states considered digital footprint legislation.
Gerry W. Beyer, Virginia and Nevada Pass Bills Regarding Management of Digital
Assets Post Mortem, WILLS, TR. & EST. PROF BLOG (Aug. 2, 2013), http:
//lawprofessors.typepad.com/trusts_estates_prof/2013/08/as-i-previouslydisscussed
there-has-been-an-increase-in-digital-life-technology-should-play-an-important-role-inestate-plan.html [http://perma.cc/3KQK-N87K] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). As discussed
in this Section, Nevada’s legislation was enacted. Another state, Virginia, recently
enacted very narrow legislation to allow for access to a minor’s account. VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.2-109 (Westlaw 2014). Additionally, effective May 21, 2013, the Maine
Legislature appointed a commission to study the legal impediments to the disposition
of digital assets upon an individual’s death or incapacity and develop legislative
recommendations by December 1, 2013. H.P. 601, 126th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me.
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legislatures have enacted on-topic statutory provisions, which are
further discussed in this Section. Such statutes alleviate federalism
concerns. They also have beneficial provisions that should be
considered in fashioning a resolution to the digital footprint. As such,
Louisiana should consider them, but the concerns triggered by them,
individually and collectively, should prevent the State from adopting
any of the existing statutory provisions in toto.
A few state statutes address only e-mail. For example, California’s
2002 statute requires that e-mail providers give a 30-day notice prior to
terminating any account.278 It does not provide for anyone to access the
decedent’s account. Further, the mandated notice may be sent to the email address in question, and therefore, if the decedent has not left
behind his username, password, and access instructions, the notice will
not be seen.279 Connecticut’s and Rhode Island’s statutes also apply
only to e-mail.280 However, both go further than California’s
provisions by requiring e-mail service providers to provide a
decedent’s succession representative with access to or copies of the
contents of the decedent’s account.281 Before doing so, Connecticut
requires receipt of either (1) a written request for such access or copies
by the executor or administrator, a copy of the death certificate, and a
certified copy of the appointment of the executor or administrator or
2013). The other states’ proposed legislations did not pass. See S.B. 29, 2013 Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2013) (As of February 18, 2013, the bill had received an “unfavorable”
report by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee.); S.B. 2313, 187th Gen.
Assemb., (Mass. 2012) (As of January 1, 2013, the bill was in the House and “no
further action was taken,” leaving its current status as “Referred to House Committee
on Steering, Policy, and Scheduling.”); S.B. 293 (Mich. 2013); Legis. B. 783, 102nd
Legis. (Neb. 2012) (“indefinitely postponed” as of April 18, 2013); H.B. 116 (N.H.
2013) (“laid on table” as of January 30, 2013); Assemb. B. 2943, 2012–2013 Reg.
Sess. (N.J. 2012) (passed by the Assembly June 21, 2012 and referred to the Senate
Commerce Committee on June 25, 2012, after which time no further action has been
reported); N.Y. State Assemb. 823, 2012–2013 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013) (referred to
the judiciary committee on January 9, 2013, with no further action reported, such that
status is currently “unknown”); S.B. 279, 2013–2014 Sess. (N.C. 2013) (although this
bill passed, the digital assets portion was removed beforehand); H.B. 1455, 63rd
Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 2013) (bill failed on April 9, 2013); S.B. 54, 2013 Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2013) (bill was in committee upon adjournment); H.B. 2580, Reg. Sess. 2011–
2012 (Pa. 2012) (referred to judiciary committee on August 23, 2012, with no further
action such that status is currently “unknown”).
278. CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17538.35 (Westlaw 2014).
279. Tarney, supra note 43, at 788.
280. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a(b) (Westlaw 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 33-27-3 (Westlaw 2014). But see Wu, supra note 10, at 6 (noting that “[s]ince
Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn provide direct messaging services, they are likely to
be considered electronic mail service providers under these statutes”).
281. CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17538.35; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a(b); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-27-3.
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(2) an order of the probate court having jurisdiction over the decedent’s
estate.282 The Rhode Island statute requires receipt of both and also
requires that the order designate the executor or administrator as agent
for the decedent under the SCA and mandate indemnity by the estate in
favor of the electronic mail service provider.283 The Connecticut statute
may run afoul of the SCA because it makes no attempt to comply.284
Further, under both statutes, the testator’s role is unclear; that is to say,
there is no direction as to whether a testator can prevent access or
require the e-mail provider to transmit the e-mails to someone other
than the succession representative.285 Additionally, the phrase “access
or copies,” clearly disjunctive, could generate confusion as to who gets
to decide whether access or copies will be provided, and if the
succession representative is allowed access, it is not clear exactly what
the succession representative can do with regard to the account
thereafter.286
Other statutes extend their applicability beyond e-mail and provide
for greater powers to the succession representative. For example, the
Oklahoma statute allows the succession representative, “where
otherwise authorized, to take control of, conduct, continue, or
terminate any accounts of a deceased person on any social networking
website, any microblogging or short message service website or any
email service websites.”287 The language “where otherwise authorized”
has generated some confusion.288 Some believe that this means the
decedent would have to specifically provide for access to his
succession representative before it would be granted, yet most
decedents die intestate. Idaho’s statute is identical except that it does
not contain the phrase “where otherwise authorized”; instead, it
defaults in favor of access yet allows for exceptions to access where
“restricted or otherwise provided by the will or by an order in a formal
proceeding.”289 It also requires that the succession representative act
reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons.290 These two
statutes improve upon others by clarifying the succession
representative’s authority and allowing the decedent more autonomy.
282. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a(b).
283. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-27-3.
284. See supra Part III.
285. Cahn, supra note 29, at 38.
286. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 148.
287. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58 § 269 (Westlaw 2014).
288. Dazza Greenwood, State Statute Empowers Executors to Conduct Digital
Identities of Deceased, DIGITAL EST. RESOURCE (Jul. 11, 2011), http://www.digitalest
ateresource.com/2011/07/state-statute-empowers-executors-to-conduct-digital-identities
-of-deceased/ [http://perma.cc/7SN2-W4EW] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). Mazzone,
Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1674–75.
289. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715 (Westlaw 2014).
290. Id.
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However, these statutes have shortcomings. First, they do not, by
their terms, require any proof of the decedent’s death. Second, they do
not allow for a decedent to grant access to someone other than his
succession representative. Third, they may run afoul of the SCA
because they make no attempt to comply.291 Fourth, the statutes’
specific lists of digital items and lack of definitions could potentially
limit the statutes’ applicability and quickly render them obsolete as
technology continues to evolve.292
Indiana’s legislation is even broader. It applies to any custodian
who electronically stores documents or other information of another
person. Additionally, it requires that the succession representative be
given access to or copies of such stored materials upon receipt of (1) a
written request for such access or copies by the succession
representative, a copy of the death certificate, and a certified copy of
the succession representative’s letters testamentary or (2) an order of
the probate court having jurisdiction over the decedent’s estate.293
Although this statute requires proof of the decedent’s death, it is not
without criticism. First, it is unclear whether a testator can prevent
access altogether or require the OSP to transmit the material to
someone other than the succession representative. Second, the statute is
ambiguous as to who is allowed to decide whether access or copies
should be provided, and in the event that the succession representative
is allowed access, it is not clear exactly what he can do with regard to
the account thereafter. Third, like most of the statutes, the Indiana
statute may run afoul of the SCA because it makes no attempt to
comply. Finally, it lacks definitions of the words “documents” and
“information,” leaving open questions about its applicability.294
Although an open-ended definition (or lack thereof) allows the law to
remain relevant for new technologies and new types of digital items, it
can also create uncertainty and confusion as to which items are
covered.295
Nevada has enacted the newest legislation, effective October 1,
2013. This statute, in the absence of contrary directions in a decedent’s
will or a court order, authorizes a decedent’s succession representative
291. See supra Part III.
292. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 144; Greenwood, supra
note 288. As one commentator noted, “The statute does not reach stored value
accounts (like PayPal), cloud storage services (like Dropbox), or non-website Internet
applications in which online assets can be stored (like Second Life or World of
Warcraft).” Wu, supra note 10, at 6.
293. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-13-1.1 (Westlaw 2014).
294. See, e.g., Ray, supra note 3, at 603; Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra
note 41, at 1674 (questioning whether social networking would qualify as
“documents”).
295. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 144.
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to direct the termination of the decedent’s accounts, including those on
social networking, web log service, Microblog service, short message
service, electronic mail service, or any similar electronic or digital item
of the decedent, but it does not allow him to terminate any of the
decedent’s financial accounts.296 This statute is broad, defaults in favor
of access, and allows a decedent to prevent access. However, it does
not require any documentation of the decedent’s death, does not allow
for the decedent to require the OSP to allow access to someone other
than the succession representative, potentially violates the SCA, and
most importantly, does not allow for any activity by the succession
representative, except for termination of the account.
Beyond the criticisms levied at each individual statute, the
collective group is subject to several more. First, a state statute may not
even apply. After all, the TOS usually include a choice-of-law
provision.297 Thus, where such a provision is respected, it is likely that
the substantive law of a state with a digital footprint statute will not
apply. Even if a digital footprint statute is applied in spite of a choiceof-law provision, some worry that the existing statutes do nothing to
address the legal issues mentioned in Part III. For example, the statutes
do not resolve the issue of whether digital items are property, may
directly conflict with the TOS by allowing a succession representative
access,298 and do not address privacy statutes.299
As a practical matter, some criticize the notion of having numerous
(potentially different) state laws in place, as this could be inefficient
and costly and could reduce certainty.300 Some have expressed concern
that by defaulting to access, some of these statutes do not consider the
wishes of the deceased.301 Some have questioned the statutes’
longevity, as they are creatures of the time period in which they were

296. S.B. 131, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013).
297. Some of the TOS choose California law, which has only the dated and
narrow statute discussed above. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17538.35 (Westlaw 2014).
298. Cahn, supra note 29, at 38; Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at
1676; Mazzone, The Right to Die Online, supra note 55, at 14; Beyer & Griffin,
supra note 43, at 7. It may be argued that decedents, by agreeing to the TOS, waived
their rights under these statutes. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at
146. However, as to digital items created before a statute’s enactment, they arguably
have not, as that would entail an anticipatory waiver. Some claim that the TOS take
precedent over state laws, Hill, supra note 16, but one commentator has predicted that
this very issue will be “the real breakout legal battle” in the digital footprint arena.
Sherry, supra note 13, at 215 (quoting Evan Carroll in a verbal interview).
299. Haller, supra note 13 (mentioning the CFAA); Beyer, supra note 10, at 12
(noting that “[w]hile state law can clarify that the fiduciary is an authorized user, this
is an issue of federal law”).
300. Ray, supra note 3, at 602.
301. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1666.
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enacted and are limited to technology that existed at that time.302
Others have criticized them as lagging behind technology and creating
confusion and unnecessary expense.303
Ultimately, these statutes are still in their infancy.304 As Professor
Naomi Cahn noted, “[W]e’re still in the process of testing how those
laws operate. They don’t cover all Internet accounts and the laws are
new enough that they’re just in the process of being worked out.”305 One
commentator has dubbed the statutes “reactionary” and worries that they
could exacerbate the digital footprint problems.306 Another has
expressed concern that they are “toothless.”307 Some state legislators
share this concern, pondering whether such statutes are premature and
potentially unenforceable.308
E. Uniform Law
Touted as the “ideal vehicle” to resolve the digital footprint issue,
another option is the creation of a uniform law.309 Currently, the
Uniform Law Commission (ULC) is working on such a law, the
Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (Act).310 This Act is
302. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 146.
303. Shah, supra note 34; Hopper, supra note 133.
304. Sillin, supra note 174.
305. Hopper, supra note 133.
306. Sherry, supra note 13, at 190.
307. Perrone, supra note 5, at 204.
308. Beyer, supra note 10, at 15.
309. Tarney, supra note 43, at 798.
310. The ULC is made up of attorneys, judges, legislators, legislative staff, and
professors appointed by state governments. Its purpose is to research and draft “nonpartisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to
critical areas of state statutory law.” Perrone, supra note 5, at 201. It then encourages the
enactment of uniform state laws. Id. This particular proposed uniform law began its
journey in May 2011 when Jim Lamm and Gene Hennig submitted a proposal for a
uniform law on the digital footprint issue. See Memorandum from Suzanne Brown
Walsh, Chair, and Professor Naomi Cahn, Reporter of the ULC FADA Comm., to
Comm. of the Whole, 2013 ULC Annual Meeting (May 23, 2013), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20
Assets/2013AM_FADA_IssuesMemo.pdf [http://perma.cc/BC74-H7VM] (archived
Feb. 24, 2014). In January 2012, after realizing the uncertainty surrounding the issue
and the need for fiduciaries to have clear powers to access digital information, the ULC
approved a resolution to form a committee to study the issue. Haworth, supra note 21,
at 11. After reviewing the study committee’s report, the ULC then appointed a drafting
committee, the Fiduciary Powers and Authority to Access Digital Information study
committee, to prepare a uniform law. See Memorandum from Suzanne Brown Walsh,
Chair, and Professor Naomi Cahn, Reporter of the ULC FADA Committee, supra.
Although initially allowed to be either free standing or an amendment to existing ULC
laws, such as the Uniform Probate Code, the Uniform Trust Code, the Uniform
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, and the Uniform Power of Attorney
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currently in draft form and in the process of possibly becoming a
uniform law.311 If so, it would grant to certain fiduciaries specified
authority over another’s digital footprint.312
More particularly, the Act provides that, if granted authority, a
decedent’s succession representative steps into the shoes of the
decedent with regard to his online digital footprint and where the
succession representative has authority over a decedent’s digital
device, he may access any record on that device.313 The Act also
provides that a succession representative has the “lawful consent” of
the decedent to access his digital footprint and is an “authorized user”
of the same, language that mirrors that of the federal privacy statutes
(the CFAA and the SCA) discussed in Part III.314
As to the succession representative’s scope of power, the Act
provides two alternatives. Under Alternative A, a succession
representative would be allowed control over the decedent’s digital
footprint and have the ability to obtain access to both the records and
contents of the same unless the decedent provided otherwise in a will
or a court prohibited this.315 Under Alternative B, a succession
representative would be allowed to access, manage, deactivate, and
delete the decedent’s digital footprint unless prohibited from doing so
by the will of the decedent, a court order, or any other law of the
Act, Committees: Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20
Digital%20Assets (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) [http://perma.cc/9MT8-EJP4] (archived
Feb. 24, 2014), the current draft is a stand-alone act. Memorandum from Suzanne
Brown Walsh, Chair, and Professor Naomi Cahn, Reporter of the ULC FADA
Committee, supra.
311. ULC Drafting Process, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniform
laws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=ULC Drafting Process (last visited Jan. 11, 2014)
[http://perma.cc/AT2U-MXLZ] (archived Mar. 7, 2014). To become a uniform act, it
must be debated at another Annual Meeting and approved by the Committee of the
Whole and a majority of states present (and no less than 20 states total). The plan is
for the ULC to have a final draft for state legislatures to consider by next summer.
Steinmetz, supra note 137.
312. Tyler Beas, Gone, but Social Media Not Forgotten: Social Media Estate
Planning Update, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=93332b62-2aee-43af-abdf-9dbffa01c143 [http://perma.cc/P7MR-T8
CE] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). Besides succession representatives, these fiduciaries
also include conservators, agents, and trustees, but since those fiduciaries represent
living persons, a discussion of them is beyond the scope of this Article.
313. Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act Draft, § 3, presented at 2013 National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Annual Meeting, available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to %20Digital%
20Assets/2013AM_FADA_Draft.pdf [http://perma.cc/73LG-HEL7] (archived Feb.
24, 2014).
314. Id. § 3 cmts.
315. Id. § 4.
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state.316 Finally, the Act grants OSPs immunity for any actions taken
pursuant to the Act.317
Proponents believe that the Act will provide guidance to courts and
solve problems of inefficiency, excessive costs, and uncertainty in the
outcome when dealing with multiple states’ laws.318 The Act has
numerous advantages. It extends to all digital property319 and at least
implicitly requires proof of death.320 It also allows the decedent to
prevent access (although it requires the decedent to do so via a will,
denying protection to the intestate decedent or to the decedent whose
will is invalid). Another benefit of the Act is that it allows the
succession representative control over the digital property, not just
access to or copies of it (although there may be some question as to
what, exactly, “exercise control” means). The indemnity provision is
also beneficial because it should encourage OSPs to comply.321
Support for the Act, however, is far from universal, and the
concerns of critics vary. Some worry about its longevity, noting that it
will need “constant monitoring and updating” as technology continues
to evolve.322 It is too limited in that it only grants authority to the
succession representative. Thus, it precludes decedent autonomy to
name someone else (or numerous others) as the appropriate person to
access his digital footprint or specific digital assets within it. Others
worry that it is too broad, giving “nearly unfettered access” to the
succession representative, which could violate the privacy of not only

316. Id. In the event that the Act is triggered, the succession representative must
submit a written request, along with a certified copy of the instrument granting
representative powers. Id. § 8 and comments thereto. The OSP must comply within
60 days of receipt of the request. Id. Failure to do so allows the succession
representative the right to apply to the court for a compliance order. Id.
317. Id. § 9. Note that the drafting committee also believes that the Act will
comply with comparable state privacy laws as well. Id. § 9 cmts.
318. Ray, supra note 3, at 605 (explaining that a uniform law “reduces strain in
the legal system and reduces costs for the applicable social media or electronic
storage companies that must deal with these issues across the nation”).
319. The definition of “digital property” includes both “digital accounts” (defined
as “an electronic system for creating, generating, sending, receiving, storing,
displaying, or processing information to which the account holder has access”) and
“digital assets” (defined as “information created, generated, sent, communicated,
received, or stored by electronic means on a digital device or system that delivers
digital information,” including a contract right). Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets
Act Draft, supra note 313, § 2.
320. It actually only requires a certified copy of the letter of appointment of the
representative. However, in the case of a death, obtaining that letter would
presumably first require proof to the issuing court that a person had died. Id. § 8.
321. Haworth, supra note 21, at 27.
322. See Comments to the draft Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act from
Richard and Diane Rash, supra note 159.
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the decedent but also the person with whom he communicated.323
Additionally, although it attempts to resolve the TOS issues by
providing that the succession representative’s control over a digital
item would not be a “transfer,” a statute arguably should not be able to,
after the fact, change the meaning of the TOS that the decedent
consented to before his death.324
Finally, although the Act attempts to comply with the CFAA and
SCA, whether it succeeds in doing so is up for debate. The SCA allows
the OSP to disclose the contents of an account only with the consent of
the originator, addressee, or intended recipient,325 and the Act attempts
to provide that the succession representative has the consent of the
decedent. Yet, unless the decedent provided this in his will or has
expressed a preference that his information be shared posthumously,
this is inaccurate.326 Therefore, the Act should arguably not apply to
the intestate decedent or to one who did not indicate his preferences.327
Further, some question whether a court would find a state law
controlling, given the existing federal statutes.328
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION
While the proffered solutions are logical and innovative, an
appropriate solution to the digital footprint issue begins with the
realization that the problems triggered by a decedent’s digital footprint
are many, and the problems, in turn, trigger analyses from a multitude
of areas of substantive law. As detailed in Part III, the three major legal
problems triggered by the digital footprint issue are: (1) whether digital
items are property, (2) the effect of the TOS that the decedent entered
into before his death, and (3) the effect of privacy statutes. Ultimately,
there is no quick-fix, and the possible solutions discussed above do not
address all three major legal problems. However, there is much value
323. Letter from Allison S. Bohm, Advocacy & Policy Strategist, American Civil
Liberties Union, to Suzanne Brown Walsh, Chair, & Professor Naomi Cahn, Reporter,
Unif. Law Comm’n (July 3, 2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared
/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013jul3_FADA_Comments
_ACLU.pdf [http://perma.cc/QEX7-EF9W] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
324. Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act Draft, supra note 313, § 3 and
comments thereto.
325. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2006).
326. Letter from Steve DelBianco, Exec. Dir., NetChoice, Carl M Szabo, Policy
Counsel, NetChoice, & James J. Halpert, General Counsel, State Privacy & Security
Coalition, to Suzanne Brown Walsh (July 8, 2013), available at http://www
.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013
jul_FADA_NetChoice_Szabo%20et%20al_Comments.pdf [http://perma.cc/H4UT-LC
2Q] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).
327. Id.
328. Id.
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to be found in the groundwork that has already been laid by
commentators, industry experts, state legislatures, and drafters of the
Act. Cobbling together the most valuable of their contributions and
adding some unique provisions could lead to a comprehensive action
plan that may better address the digital footprint issue. After all, “new
technologies may require new approaches to old problems.”329 The
digital footprint issue requires a two-front attack: one grounded in both
federal and state law.
Federal action is required to address the issues presented by the
federal privacy statutes, the CFAA and SCA, both of which
presumably (and probably inadvertently) preclude one from accessing
a decedent’s digital footprint.330 While some state statutes and the Act
attempt to comply with these federal statutes, such efforts arguably
cannot trump an existing federal statute. Therefore, Congress should
amend the CFAA and SCA to carve out exceptions for state digital
footprint statutes. That is to say, both federal statutes should be
amended to specifically provide that one who accesses a decedent’s
digital footprint in compliance with a state statute will not violate either
the CFAA or the SCA. As to the CFAA, it could be amended to
proclaim such action “authorized”; as to the SCA, it could be amended
to proclaim such action “authorized” and “consented to.” This
approach would be similar to that of the Act. However, the Act, if
adopted in a given state, would apply only in that state; amending the
CFAA and SCA would affect a resolution nationwide and would
alleviate any federal supremacy concerns. That would resolve one area
of substantive law problems presented by the digital footprint issue.
Congress should also take it further. As mentioned in Part V, because a
decedent’s digital footprint triggers legal issues in the realm of
property and estate law, resolving the digital footprint issue falls within
the purview of the states according to the Tenth Amendment. Thus,
notions of federalism and comity should limit congressional
willingness to dictate the fate of digital assets. However, some of the
benefits of a federal statute could be realized if Congress would enact a
statute recognizing the power and legitimacy of existing state digital
asset laws and those that may be enacted in the future.
Federal action is just part of the solution. Once Congress amends
existing privacy statutes and puts its weight behind state statutes, states
must then do their part. Louisiana, like other states, needs a digital
footprint statute, but the content of that statute is “the million dollar
question.”331 According to Professor Cahn, “If you’re going to be
329. Letter from Allison S. Bohm, supra note 323.
330. See supra Part III.
331. Cohen, supra note 11 (quoting Doug Surtees, a wills lawyer and associate
dean of law at the University of Saskatchewan).
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creating a new law that deals with what happens to digital assets when
someone can no longer manage them, you might as well be as
comprehensive as possible . . . .”332
The first thing Louisiana should do in its statute is to ensure that
the statute will apply even in the face of TOS that contain choice-oflaw provisions. Louisiana already has a tool in place to do this.
Louisiana Civil Code article 3540 provides that the parties’ choice of
law will be respected “except to the extent that law contravenes the
public policy of the state whose law would otherwise be applicable
under Article 3537.”333 That article, in turn, provides for the applicable
law to be the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously
impaired if its law were not applied to that issue.334 Given Louisiana’s
strong interest in the orderly administration of its deceased
domiciliaries’ estates, it is likely that its law would be applicable under
article 3537. Thus, Louisiana could amend its conflict-of-laws articles
to specifically proclaim that applying the law of any other state
contravenes the state’s public policy when it comes to digital
footprints.335
After ascertaining the applicability of its own law on the subject,
Louisiana should enact a revised statute to govern a decedent’s entire
digital footprint. Thus, relevant terms should be defined, and the
resulting definitions should “be broad enough to evolve with online
innovation and be clear enough for lawyers, online service providers,
and the general public to understand what is included under the
definition[s].”336 Louisiana should look to the definitions in the Act as
a starting point. Under the latest draft, “digital property” is defined as
“the lawful ownership and management of and rights related to a
digital account and digital asset.”337 “Digital account,” in turn, is
defined as “an electronic system for creating, generating, sending,
receiving, storing, displaying, or processing information to which the
account holder has access,” and “digital asset” is defined as
“information created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or
stored by electronic means on a digital device or system that delivers
digital information.”338 While these definitions are an excellent first
step, one of the difficulties in defining terms in a technology-related
statute is the risk that the definitions chosen will become obsolete in
short order as technology continues to outpace the law. Therefore,
332. Beyer, supra note 277.
333. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3540 (2014).
334. Id. art. 3537.
335. Louisiana is no stranger to making public policy proclamations in its conflictof-laws articles. See, e.g., id. art. 3520.
336. Haworth, supra note 21, at 3.
337. Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act Draft, supra note 313, § 2.
338. Id.
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Louisiana should extend these definitions to capture digital items that
may not yet be popular or may not yet even exist. In that vein, the
Legislature should consider incorporating catch-all language into the
definitions. The Nevada and Virginia statutes present viable options:
“any similar electronic or digital asset” or “other online accounts or
comparable items as technology develops.”339 While such open-ended
phrases may be subject to criticism as vague and potentially overinclusive, using them would serve the critical purpose of omitting the
need to constantly amend the statute as technology continues to
develop.
After defining the relevant terms, the Louisiana statute should
clarify the place of one’s digital footprint within the realm of property
and estate law. As discussed in Part III, typically, if a thing is property,
it is susceptible of ownership. If it is susceptible of ownership, the
owner may transfer it during his lifetime or upon his death via will or
trust. If he fails to do so, the laws of intestate devolution will transfer it
for him upon his death. However, if the thing in question is not
property, then it cannot be owned or transferred. As detailed in Part III,
many digital items are properly classified as licenses by the OSPs’
TOS and are not owned or susceptible of transfer by the decedent.
Therefore, Louisiana should bifurcate the concepts of ownership and
heritability when it comes to a person’s digital footprint.
As to ownership, existing state and federal property and intellectual
property law should be used to determine whether a specific digital
item is property. Thus, if current law would classify an item as
property, then its status should not be affected by its storage in digital
form. For example, a photograph would be considered property
whether it has been developed and printed or whether it is still stored in
digital form. Under this approach then, some digital items would
qualify as property, but others would not. For example, those digital
items that are, per the TOS, simply licenses would not be classified as
property. Additionally, digital items should be classified individually,
such that one digital item may be classified differently than the digital
item on which it is stored. For example, a picture uploaded onto a
photo-sharing website would be classified as property under federal
copyright and state property law, but the account on which it is stored
would not.
Using current property law in isolation would affect no change to
the digital footprint dilemma and would result in some digital items
dying with the decedent. Thus, laws on the heritability (i.e.,
susceptibility of transfer) of digital items are needed. Obviously, a
digital item that qualifies as property is heritable. After all, “[t]he right
339. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 64.2-109 (Westlaw 2014); S.B. 131, 2013 Reg. Sess.
(Nev. 2013).
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to own and pass on property at death has been a vital property right in
the U.S. legal system for hundreds of years and should not be
destroyed by the digital nature of assets.”340 However, even digital
items not qualifying as property under current law, but instead
classified as something else (like a license), should be heritable.
Providing otherwise, as is the case under current law, is unfair. As one
scholar noted, “[W]hen you die, no one tears down your real life house
or burns your paper letters, but with virtual worlds and online services,
the service provider may delete your account, your online house, your
virtual goods, your electronic files, and your mail.”341
Of course, providing for the heritability of all digital items violates
some TOS. However, “boilerplate provisions (often not even read by
users) should be barred from rewriting probate laws that would
otherwise govern whether a particular asset is inheritable.”342
Louisiana already has one piece of legislation in place to aid its efforts.
Louisiana Civil Code article 7 provides that persons may not, by
contract, derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public
interest.343 Louisiana could specify that its digital footprint statute is
enacted “for the protection of the public interest.” Additionally,
amending the conflicts articles as suggested above would further
bolster the status of the Louisiana digital footprint statute. The
combination of these pronouncements would negate any nontransferability provisions in TOS by making them void ab initio. Not
only would this aid in the orderly administration of successions, but
“[f]rom a business standpoint, supporting transferability upon death
might lead to more continuous and stronger client relationships.”344
However, while all digital items should be susceptible of transfer, not
all digital items should necessarily be transferred in all situations.
Instead, Louisiana should legislate their fate as follows.
First, Louisiana should follow the approach employed by
Oklahoma, Idaho, Nevada, and the Act and respect the wishes of a
testate decedent by specifying that any provisions in his will addressing
digital items should be honored. This includes any denial by the
decedent of access to his digital footprint. Unlike current statutes that
are silent on the issue, Louisiana should specifically respect the wishes
of a decedent who grants access to someone other than the executor of
his will; in fact, Louisiana should respect the designations of different
persons to access different digital items. Additionally, the decedent
340. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 241. See also Sherry, supra note 13, at 188.
341. Wu, supra note 10, at 4.
342. Tarney, supra note 43, at 793. See also Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 127, at
314 (discussing the issue in the context of e-mail).
343. LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 (2014).
344. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 226.
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should be allowed to provide his wishes in a juridical act other than a
will. Louisiana is known for its hyper-formal approach to testaments,
and a decedent leaving instructions for his digital footprint in a will
risks having his wishes disregarded due to a form problem. That said,
the law must also protect against unauthorized access to a decedent’s
digital footprint. Thus, Louisiana’s statute should allow for a
decedent’s wishes to be contained either in a valid testament or
juridical act solemnized by a notary who is not granted access to a
decedent’s digital footprint.
However, the decedent who dies without planning for his digital
estate presents bigger challenges. In such a case, the question arises as
to how the decedent would have wanted his digital footprint handled at
death, and competing policies must be considered and weighed
appropriately. As discussed in Part II, whether to allow access to a
decedent’s digital footprint triggers a variety of interests, some of
which weigh in favor of and some of which weigh against access.
Policies such as efficient estate administration, as well as the grieving
and closure interests of those left behind and societal interests in
preserving history, suggest that access should be granted. Conversely,
the privacy rights of the decedent and those with whom he
communicated and the contractual relationship between the decedent
and the OSP dictate against access.
Most of the other statutes addressing the digital footprint issue
employ a “one-size-fits-all” approach. That is to say, if the statute’s
requirements are satisfied, it grants access across the board. If the
statute’s requirements are not satisfied, it denies access across the
board. Yet, given the variety of existing digital items, access should not
be granted or denied in blanket fashion because different digital items
can trigger different combinations of the competing interests to
different degrees. It would seem that “the reasonable man” may have
wanted his various digital items treated differently. For example, he
may have no problem with those left behind accessing his eBay
account or his online banking account. He may have a big problem
with those same people accessing and reading all of his e-mails or
logging in to see everything in his Facebook inbox. Recognizing the
unique nature of different digital items, Louisiana’s statute should
tailor its rules on access to the particular digital item in question.
The statute should begin with a deep-seated respect for the
decedent’s privacy rights. In order to facilitate those rights, its starting
point should be a presumption against access to the decedent’s digital
footprint. However, the statute should also recognize that other
interests (besides the decedent’s privacy) are triggered by the digital
footprint situation.345 In order to balance those competing interests, the
345. See supra Part II.
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presumption against access should be a rebuttable one, and the statute
should allow for an interested person to gain access to a decedent’s
digital item by showing by clear and convincing evidence that he has
good cause for access. For example, perhaps a decedent has left behind
a business, and his customer lists and orders are stored in an online
document management system. In such a case, his successor to that
business should be able to show good cause for accessing the digital
item in question. Or maybe the decedent’s wedding photographs have
been stored in an online photo site. His spouse should satisfy the good
cause requirement for wanting to access that particular digital item.
Adopting a “good cause” standard would allow for some judicial
flexibility, while requiring clear and convincing evidence of that good
cause would serve to weed out frivolous requests.
While this rebuttable presumption model will allow for equitable
results as to most digital items, the statute should also recognize that it
may not be the best and most targeted approach for all digital items.
Instead, two types of digital items should receive different treatment
under the statute. One of them is e-mail; the other is the digital items
with monetary value.
E-mail is a unique digital item that deserves tailored treatment. As
mentioned in Part I, e-mail serves as the master key to other digital
items because access to a decedent’s e-mail account could lead to the
discovery of other digital items. Some of those digital items could be
things like bank accounts or other assets that stand to increase the value
of the decedent’s patrimony and, as a result, the value of the
successors’ inheritance. Thus, if the decedent’s e-mail account would
reveal the existence of financially valuable assets, the successors have
a strong interest, from an estate administration standpoint, in accessing
that e-mail account. Of course, an e-mail account could also contain
information that could be damaging to the posthumous reputation of
the decedent and to other people. As such, e-mail is a unique digital
item that lies at the intersection of two very compelling policies, and
the Louisiana statute should therefore not subject a decedent’s e-mail
account to any presumption against or in favor of access. A presumption
either way would be unfair. Instead, one wanting to know the contents
of a decedent’s e-mail account should have to petition the court for it.
However, given the very real and heightened dangers associated with
the contents of a decedent’s e-mail account, the court should not
simply grant or deny access to a decedent’s e-mail account. Instead, a
decedent’s e-mail account should be subject to in camera review in
which the person reviewing the e-mail account does so solely to look
for the existence of other digital items. Of course, such a review would
be time-consuming and administratively burdensome. To ease the
burden on the judiciary, an independent third party, such as a special
master or court-appointed attorney, could conduct this review. Of
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course, that person would be compensated for his time and effort,
which could be expensive. Therefore, the person petitioning the court
for the in camera review should be responsible for the costs associated
with the review.346 Allocating costs this way should discourage people
from seeking review unless they have a good faith belief that other
digital items of value (from a financial or sentimental standpoint) will
be located.
Digital items with monetary value should also be treated
differently. For these digital items, the successors have a very strong
interest in access. This is because digital items with monetary value
will increase the value of the decedent’s patrimony and, in turn,
increase the value of the successor’s inheritance. On the contrary, the
privacy interests are weak. Although it is theoretically possible that
digital items with monetary value could contain damaging information,
it is far less likely than in the e-mail situation. Given this balance of
interests, a presumption against access is inappropriate. Instead, one
petitioning for access to these digital items should first have to prove
that the digital item in question does, in fact, have monetary value.
Assuming that threshold is cleared, anyone opposing access should be
heard, and the judge should balance the estate administration interests
against the privacy interests of the decedent. In doing so, he should
first consider the likelihood that the digital item in question will
contain any of the decedent’s private information. Given the low risk
of this, in camera review by an independent third party should not be
required. The judge should then consider the digital items’ monetary
value to the successors. Only where he decides that the monetary value
to the successors is likely to outweigh the privacy interests of the
decedent and others should he grant access.
If and when access is granted, the concept of access should be
clearly delineated in the statute. Thus, Louisiana should not follow the
approach of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Indiana by providing for
“access to or copies of” the digital material. Instead, Louisiana should
follow the approach of Oklahoma, Idaho, and the Act and allow for the
one accessing a decedent’s digital footprint to be allowed to access,
control, conduct, continue, manage, deactivate, and delete the account
in question. In essence, like under the Virginia statute, the
administrator should be allowed to step into the shoes of the decedent
and assume the digital item in question.
The Louisiana statute should also include some procedural
safeguards. For example, it should contain a provision requiring proof of
death. Like the statutes in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Virginia,
Louisiana legislation should require a person seeking a decedent’s
digital footprint to provide to the OSP a written request, along with (1) a
346. Tarney, supra note 43, at 799.
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copy of the death certificate and a copy of the decedent’s grant of
authority to the person requesting or (2) an order of the court of probate
that, by law, has jurisdiction over the decedent’s estate. It should also
require that those seeking access to a decedent’s digital footprint do so
within a specific time frame. This would encourage timely resolution of
the issue and would also facilitate the speedy resolution of successions.
The statute should also provide that if access is not sought in a timely
fashion, the OSP can delete the decedent’s account (as long as it backs it
up). Finally, like the Rhode Island and Virginia statutes and the Act, the
Louisiana statute should provide indemnity for OSPs, and similar to the
Idaho statute, it should impose an obligation of good faith upon anyone
granted access to a digital asset.
CONCLUSION
A decedent’s digital footprint is a topic that is complicated and
constantly evolving. As the number of available digital items and the
number of people using them continue to grow, the importance of the
topic will likewise grow. The topic triggers numerous conflicting
policies and numerous legal issues in numerous areas of substantive law.
The current approach, i.e., estate planning, does not fully resolve the
issues presented—neither do suggested solutions like an ad hoc
approach, company changes, a federal statute, state statutes, or a uniform
law. What is needed is the one-two punch of federal and state action.
Existing federal legislation must be amended to prevent inadvertent
criminal and civil liability by those left behind. States must then legislate
the fate of a decedent’s digital footprint. Louisiana’s statute should
address the conflict-of-laws issues and define the relevant terms in a way
that will evolve as technology does. It should also bifurcate concepts of
ownership and heritability, such that the transfer of all digital items is
possible. That said, the statute should respect a testator’s desire not to
transfer them and should specifically provide that the statute itself is
enacted in the public interest, so that OSPs’ TOS will not bar
transferability. The statute should also comply with any and all testator
decisions with regard to his digital footprint, but in the event that a
decedent dies intestate or without instructions, Louisiana should avoid
the “one-size-fits-all” approach followed in existing legislation. Instead,
it should consider the strength of interests triggered by different digital
items and enact legislation that appropriately reflects that consideration
by treating different digital items differently. In the event that access is
granted per the statute, it should provide for broad powers. It should also
demand a proof of death, set time limits, and provide indemnity for the
OSP. Technology is not going to slow down, but enacting proactive,
comprehensive legislation such as that recommended in this Article
would allow Louisiana to avoid being left behind.

